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Abstract
Billions of dollars are lost every year to successful cyber attacks that
are fundamentally enabled by software vulnerabilities. Modern cyber at-
tacks increasingly threaten individuals, organizations, and governments,
causing service disruption, inconvenience, and costly incident response.
Given that such attacks are primarily enabled by software vulnerabilities,
this work examines the efficacy of using change metrics, along with archi-
tectural burst and maintainability metrics, to predict modules and files
that might be analyzed or tested further to excise vulnerabilities prior to
release.
The problem addressed by this research is the residual vulnerability
problem, or vulnerabilities that evade detection and persist in released
software. Many modern software projects are over a million lines of code,
and composed of reused components of varying maturity. The sheer
size of modern software, along with the reuse of existing open source
modules, complicates the questions of where to look, and in what order
to look, for residual vulnerabilities.
Traditional code complexity metrics, along with newer frequency based
churn metrics (mined from software repository change history), are se-
lected specifically for their relevance to the residual vulnerability prob-
lem. We compare the performance of these complexity and churn metrics
iii
to architectural level change burst metrics, automatically mined from the
git repositories of the Mozilla Firefox Web Browser, Apache HTTP Web
Server, and the MySQL Database Server, for the purpose of predicting
attack prone files and modules.
We offer new empirical data quantifying the relationship between
our selected metrics and the severity of vulnerable files and modules,
assessed using severity data compiled from the NIST National Vulnera-
bility Database, and cross-referenced to our study subjects using unique
identifiers defined by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
vulnerability catalog. Specifically, we evaluate our metrics against the
severity scores from CVE entries associated with known-vulnerable files
and modules. We use the severity scores according to the Base Score Met-
ric from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), corresponding
to applicable CVE entries extracted from the NIST National Vulnerability
Database, which we associate with vulnerable files and modules via au-
tomated and semi-automated techniques. Our results show that archi-
tectural level change burst metrics can perform well in situations where
more traditional complexity metrics fail as reliable estimators of vulner-
ability severity. In particular, results from our experiments on Apache
HTTP Web Server indicate that architectural level change burst metrics
show high correlation with the severity of known vulnerable modules,
and do so with information directly available from the version control
repository change-set (i.e., commit) history.
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Chapter 1
Security Vulnerabilities and Software
The economic externalities stemming from exploited security vulnerabilities in soft-
ware are a multi-billion dollar problem [79]. Each year, world-wide economies, cor-
porations, and individuals shoulder financial damage stemming from successful at-
tacks on computers and networks–attacks ultimately enabled by software vulnerabil-
ities. Such attacks lead to lost productivity, data disclosure, and identity theft. In re-
sponse, several organizations have adopted secure software development practices,
including practices such as code review, use of static analysis tools, and penetration
testing to remove these attack enabling vulnerabilities.
The goal of secure software development practices is to eliminate vulnerabilities
before they enter the field. However, exhaustive application of secure development
practices for all code is often not feasible or cost effective. While it may seem rea-
sonable for an organization to apply secure development practices to all newly writ-
ten code, one must simultaneously acknowledge that not all code is new. Modern
software systems are composed of multiple components, each possibly of varying
maturity. Some of these components may have been developed before adopting se-
cure development practices. Moreover, it is often prohibitively expensive to require
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that all pre-existing modules be re-written or that secure development practices be
retroactively applied.
The cost associated with re-engineering and re-testing pre-existing modules is
often not considered worthwhile when pitted against newer development efforts
competing for the same limited development resources. Development teams must
therefore decide where to focus energies for extended security reviews, penetration
testing, and emphasis to place on fixing defects identified by static analysis tools.
The defect search space in modern software systems is enormous–often several
million lines of code. As such, the level of effort to unearth vulnerabilities and re-
move them under time-to-market pressure is at odds with the level of effort required
by attackers to find and exploit vulnerabilities. The effort required by an attacker
to violate software security defenses is linear, requiring an attacker to find a single
weakness to exploit. As Bellovin [19] states, “whatever the defense, a single well-
placed blow can shatter it.” On the other hand, the effort required to assure that
software is secure is exponential, requiring exhaustive and comprehensive knowl-
edge of the software and all its possible interactions with its environment; this sim-
ply isn’t tractable [19].
Identification of attack-prone components is an important step in preventing
vulnerabilities from entering the field. With knowledge about which components
are most vulnerable, managers can allocate more resources for extended security
reviews, automated static analysis, and penetration testing. The added scrutiny and
focused effort can help to identify and eliminate vulnerabilities prior to software
release.
2
1.1 The Residual Vulnerability Problem
The problem addressed by this research is the residual vulnerability problem – the
presence of attack enabling security vulnerabilities in released software. Residual
vulnerabilities in modern software systems such as mobile phones, personal com-
puters, Web servers, and various embedded devices (e.g. SCADA) allow attackers to
compromise both the host systems and the networks to which these systems are
connected. Secure software engineering practices seek to identify and remove these
vulnerabilities prior to release, but the application and management of these prac-
tices may be nontrivial in practice. Project size, maturity, and development team
culture all play a part in effectively applying secure engineering practices. As an
example, consider the practice of using a static analysis tool to search a product’s
source for frequently abused function calls, memory (mis)management, and other
problematic patterns.
A development team can typically keep pace with warnings generated by a static
analysis tool for newly developed code. In contrast, running a static analysis tool
on a large, pre-existing code base may produce such a high warning count that the
task of addressing the tool warnings becomes its own development activity, with
the term backlog often used to differentiate tool warnings on pre-existing code from
warnings on newly authored code. A dedicated team, or a managed effort span-
ning several teams, may be required to “triage” (inspect and evaluate) the warnings
in order to determine whether further action is needed. Time spent triaging false
positives, or warnings that do not actually translate into actual runtime faults, is es-
sentially wasted time. The development team, overwhelmed with the large number
of warnings, may be unsure how to proceed with triaging warnings and subsequently
prioritizing fixes for legitimate defects. Consequently, the development team may
3
be at a loss as to how use their time effectively.
This research addresses the residual vulnerability problem by identifying and
prioritizing attack-prone code units to better guide review and penetration testing
efforts. First, we seek to reduce the vulnerability search space in a given software
product by correctly predicting modules and files containing exploitable vulnerabil-
ities. Second, we further consider the practical question of how to rank prediction
results. Toward this end, we evaluate the feasibility of using architectural graphs
to prioritize further development activity induced by the predictions (e.g. triage,
patching, and verification).
Code units vary in granularity, with modules or packages at the coarse end of the
spectrum, files and classes in the mid range, down to methods and lines at the fine
end. To facilitate brevity and generalize discussion across the code units, this work
coins the term “vulnerability suspects” or simply “suspects” to refer to prediction
results at these various levels of granularity. This becomes relevant when presenting
ideas related to prioritization. Since the prioritization and ranking scheme is derived
from architectural structure (i.e. graphs of modules), it follows that the ranking,
R(m) for a modulem can be extended downward to the classes, files, methods, and
lines contained within m.
1.2 Vulnerability Research Questions and Hypotheses
Many existing works in defect and vulnerability prediction attempt to model the in-
fluence of size and complexity on residual defects. Often, the size and complexity
metrics are extracted directly from the source code. The premise underlying exist-
ing prediction works is that increased size and complexity increase the difficulty
of comprehension and coverage. Difficulty in comprehension impacts the ability of
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developers and reviewers to understand the more detailed workings of the code as
well as how unintended side effects could be unknowingly introduced when code
is added, deleted, or modified. Difficulty in coverage impacts the ability of testers
to adequately test a program. The common theme explored in existing prediction
works is that increased size and complexity lead to an increased number of resid-
ual defects in released software. By comparison, fewer studies examine higher level
factors that could similarly increase defect introduction and reduce defect detection.
Higher level factors likely to influence residual defects include developer char-
acteristics (such as experience and familiarity with changed code), the rate of code
changes, and whether or not those changes are made to a system or component
amenable to change. For example, unintended side effects are likely to result when
modifying code of poor maintainability that uses several shared global variables (i.e.
exhibits poor modularity and encapsulation). This work intends to extend existing
change-based predictors, augmenting them with architectural metrics indicative of
maintainability and modularity. Below, ϕ is a predicted vulnerability. A predicted
vulnerability can come from various prediction models and may include defect warn-
ings from a static analysis tool.
Research Question 1. Can change metrics reflecting frequent, high volume, or re-
cent changes be used to predict vulnerable code units ϕ?
Research Question 2. Can architectural metrics reflecting poor modularity or main-
tainability be used to predict vulnerable modules?
Research Question 3. Can architectural metrics reflecting modularity or maintain-
ability be used to prioritize change-based predictions,ϕ, relative to one another?
Recent work has shown promising performance for change-based fault and vul-
nerability prediction metrics. This work seeks to expand on existing churn and
developer based predictors by evaluating whether or not additional architectural
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metrics can be used to prioritize change-based vulnerability predictions. We hypoth-
esize that changes, already indicative of a vulnerable file, made to a module of poor
maintainability or modularity will be more likely than its peers to positively correlate
with the severity of associated residual vulnerabilities.
Using the additional architectural context, one can also ask what components
are more likely to process attacker crafted data. That is, one can investigate how
data might funnel through a system given its front line functions [25], attack surface
[51], and a component’s relation to the same. The component relationship may be
expressed as a call path distance or coupling. Figure 1.1 shows a labeled graph for
a program with m = 100 functions, a FLF density of 2%, and a path length of p =
mk = 100(0.02) = 2, after the reverse breadth first search algorithm detailed in [25].
The read() function in this case is the front line function. Components sitting at
the outer edges of the system interfacing with network connections, databases, and
input fields are more prone to attacker manipulation. We hypothesize that methods
closer to so called front line functions are more attack prone than other methods in
the system.
1.3 Significance
The significance of this research is in optimizing resource utilization. One of the
most expensive and limited resources in modern software development is developer
time. Additional review and testing of various software artifacts (e.g. architectural
designs, drivers, libraries, modules, and application code) is only warranted if there
is reason to believe those artifacts may be attack prone. Moreover, the supply of
time and expertise from security-competent developers and testers is arguably more
restricted due to the specialized knowledge required to unearth security vulnerabil-
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Figure 1.1: Front line function read(), with path length p = 2
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ities. This research aims to intelligently focus these energies on those artifacts most
likely to exhibit vulnerabilities. The analogy to resource utilization is much the same
as the surgical laser analogy used justifying lightweight formal methods: “A surgical
laser has less power and coverage than a traditional light bulb, but makes the most
efficient use of the energy it uses, with often more impressive results.” [42]
This research complements existing tools and predictive approaches which have
already examined the use of code-based metrics as predictors. However, this work
more closely examines evolutionary and architectural aspects of the software by:
1. Investigating how change metrics correlate with residual vulnerability severity,
and
2. Examining how the software module structure either exposes or masks residual
vulnerabilities.
This work approaches attack-prone prediction from a contextual and practical
perspective. As such, when compared with other work in vulnerability prediction,
the predictors in this work have the potential to reveal relationships between a prod-
uct’s security (measured by residual vulnerabilities) and how the product’s code was
developed. For example, the following questions characterize the types of questions
we might reason about:
• Do rapid and scattered code changes possibly indicate increased development
activity under time-to-market or competitive pressure?
• Do atypically frequent and repeated changes to a module or file possibly in-
dicate a poor understanding of requirements, or a challenging technical issue,
such that the module or file requires ongoing rework?
• Do the environmental conditions implied by the above factors also correspond
to a large number of security failures?
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• Do security failures seem either more severe or more prevalent for components
of poor modularity?
• Do security failures seem either more severe or more prevalent for components
of poor maintainability?
Additionally, we relate prediction models to the attack surface of a system along
its boundaries with the surrounding environment after [51]. Attacker-formed data
will enter the system at these boundaries. This is the practical aspect missing from
the bulk of defect and vulnerability prediction research, save that as more recently
acknowledged by Younis, Malaiya, and Ray [92] [94]. Consider a legitimate vulnera-
bility identified in the system. With the exception of the aforementioned researchers,
vulnerability prediction literature is largely devoid of any discussion of the likelihood
of its execution, or the anticipated severity of such a vulnerability. This work investi-
gates if architectural information can fill the void with respect to severity. Likelihood
is examined, albeit indirectly in that we draw on similar past research and concepts
as described in the following paragraphs.
Likelihood of execution is assessed using graph metrics characterizing a com-
ponent’s connection to system entry points [51], such as front line functions [25],
exit points, channels, and untrusted data. The intuition is that components exhibit-
ing shorter distance or higher coupling (inter-component cohesion) to elements at
the boundary between the system and its environment, after [51], are more likely to
process attacker-crafted data.
Severity may be further assessed using relative component entropy, calculated
utilizing a data flow connection graph after [12]. The greater the relative entropy is
for a component, so also goes the potential for damage when executing a contained
vulnerability, and conversely, potential benefit resulting from vulnerability removal.
The addition of architectural considerations, and metrics reflecting the same,
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better enable the results from vulnerability prediction models to be used as another
touch point within secure software engineering life cycle models, as another static
analysis tool for security improvement. The addition of architectural considerations
provide practical benefits as they mirror ideas from operational security such as risk
analysis, and so called value-of-protection calculations, that require likelihood and
severity as input [70].
The majority of developers and testers are trained to verify conformance to func-
tional requirements, statements about specific tasks or functions the software is to
provide. Security assurance, on the other hand, probes for and tests the negative
– that the software will not have unintended side affects when pushed outside its
specifications. To remain secure, the software must not perform unintended actions
even when used in unanticipated ways by an intelligent attacker. As a consequence,
developers and testers specializing in security are trained to think like attackers and
to look for specific classes of defects across a wide range of technologies. These spe-
cialized resource constraints are at odds with the amount of code requiring coverage.
The goal of this research is to help focus these limited resources on those artifacts
most likely to contain security vulnerabilities.
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of this research are as follows:
• Aid security improvement by reducing the search space for residual vulnera-
bilities,
• Evaluate the feasibility of using information theoretic architectural metrics to
further prune and prioritize predictions (i.e. vulnerability indicators),
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• Contribute new knowledge to the field related to the relationship among secu-
rity, complexity, and architectural quality attributes (modularity and maintain-
ability),
• Provide open source tools for measuring information theoretic architectural
metrics describing modularity and maintainability, and
• Add change burst empirics to the growing body of literature on defect and
vulnerability prediction in open source projects.
The overall goal of this research is to improve security of consumer software
products by enabling organizations to more effectively find and remove vulnerabili-
ties prior to release. The goal of this research is to make vulnerability identification
and removal more tractable and cost effective by reducing the number of compo-
nents suggested for extended security review and penetration testing. This work
speculates that organizations developing consumer software will be more motivated
to expend additional effort on a more feasible and narrowly focused objective. This
is in contrast to taking no action because either (1) the probability of finding real
vulnerabilities is near infinitesimal (i.e. wasting time searching for the proverbial
needle in a haystack), or (2) because tool-predicted vulnerabilities are so numerous
that the development team is simply overwhelmed. On the latter point, the sheer
number of defects is an issue because false positive rates of modern tools necessi-
tate that development teams manually inspect, or “triage", each identified issue. On
both points, triage efforts typically lose out to other development activities such as
fixing observed bugs or developing new features.
The new and novel part of this work is the addition of suspect prioritization en-
abled by architectural metrics. The re-application of architectural metrics (charac-
terizing modularization and maintainability) provide the foundation needed for pri-
oritizing predicted components. Such relative prioritization is largely absent from
existing defect and vulnerability prediction literature. Nevertheless, establishing
11
priority is important because it recognizes that not all vulnerabilities are created
equal. Paraphrasing a common saying, “Nothing is top priority when everything is
top priority".
Priority enables an organization to set customized goals, such as “fix all se-
vere, high-impact vulnerabilities”, that better align with near and long term business
strategies. In effect, the addition of priority better recognizes the socioeconomic
realities and human factors characterizing the environment in which software is de-
veloped. For example, consider how a start-up may cease to exist if they cannot
release a working product before their seed money expires. In general, competitive
time-to-market pressures, along with modern companies’ need to rapidly innovate,
imply that companies will not release perfect software. It is common practice to re-
lease a software product with known issues, as long as those issues are minor. This
research’s addition of priority would enable such priority-based go/no-go decisions.
An additional benefit realized by developing a relative ranking among modules on
the basis of their potential vulnerability severity, is that this ranking is complemen-
tary for use with other defect identification and removal techniques. As mentioned
in Section 1.1, a relative ranking at the module level could be extended downward
to contained functions and lines. By extension, the ranking could also be extended
to tools that find defects at the line level, such as existing static analysis tools. A
relative module ranking might be used to prioritize line level alerts output from a
commercial static analysis tool (e.g., identifying the top n “actionable alerts”).
Although techniques have been published for calculating various information
theoretic metrics from the structural and development views of a software architec-
ture [77], there is currently no publicly available tool support for doing the same.
Tool support is important for practical technique application as well as comparing
results via repeatable and verifiable experiments [29]. Availability of a publicly ob-
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tainable tool reduces the barrier to entry for researchers interested in evaluating the
sensitivity and discriminatory power of architectural metrics. Since this work must
have access to such a tool, we intend on building this tool and subsequently making
it available to others.
1.5 Research Scope
The scope and context of this work is important in understanding intended contribu-
tion. This work assumes a commercial development context characterized by time-
to-market pressure, code reuse, and limited development resources (e.g. man-days).
The release of many software products occurs inside this type of environment–a
competitive landscape where vendors must hit target dates as part of a larger busi-
ness or marketing strategy. Time pressures and limited mandays for developing
new sale-generating features leave little time for performing extended security re-
views of reused code, especially when the search space for possible vulnerabilities
is impossibly large. The development context outlined above is important because
it drives the need for prioritization and effective resource utilization.
As residual vulnerability detection is a pre-requisite for removal, this work fo-
cuses on detection. Detection methods can be broadly classified into static and
dynamic (e.g., test based) techniques. Prediction can be of various forms as well, but
this work focuses on static prediction techniques which do not require system exe-
cution. Static approaches are particularly attractive for vulnerability removal since
future attacks are not known a priori by those developing the software. Static ap-
proaches can also be applied earlier in the SDL, since it is not necessary to have a
running system.
Given the activity of the research community on defect and vulnerability pre-
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diction derived from change (AKA process) metrics, we focus less on re-applying
those techniques to our study subjects. Instead, our focus is on evaluating the util-
ity of architectural modularity and maintainability metrics for vulnerability predic-
tion. Therefore, we utilize the most promising change based metrics (e.g. churn
and change bursts) from related research and additionally investigate architectural
metrics.
Vulnerability prediction is fundamentally a classification exercise. Software ob-
jects are classified as vulnerable or neutral. Such classification takes place on soft-
ware objects of varying granularity with results at the module, file, function, or line
level. Although some classifiers work at the level of individual lines, the present
study considers that existing commercial static analysis tools already work at the
line level to generate alerts for known vulnerability patterns. Additionally, exist-
ing works [81] have already explored structural dependency graphs from a function
level. Therefore, the focus of the present study is on source code at the file level and
above. While tools we use, such as architectural recovery tools, may output function
level invocation relations, we carry out additional processing to group such relations
at the file and module level.
1.6 Organization
The rest of this work is organized as follows:
Chapter 2. A Survey of Secure and Empirical Software Engineering discusses the
background in from both Secure Software Engineering and Empirical Software
Engineering in which this work is couched. The chapter covers relevant terms
and concepts, as well as related work in vulnerability detection.
Chapter 3. Vulnerability Prediction Modeling and Evaluation provides a more
detailed view of the prediction model building process. We also provide ad-
ditional detail on metrics extracted, and formulas used for data evaluation.
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Chapter 4. Detailed Repository Mining Approach outlines our research approach
and data mining methodology. We describe software studied (i.e., our case-
study subjects) and rationale used to select specific version ranges for the same.
Chapter 5. Experimental Results, and Analysis of Vulnerability Predictions
describes experimental results and analysis for each software case study.
Chapter 6. Contributions and Future Work concludes the work with parting thoughts
and ideas for future work that may build upon this work.
15
Chapter 2
A Survey of Secure and Empirical
Software Engineering
This work bridges the fields of secure software engineering (SSE) and empirical soft-
ware engineering (ESE). Secure software engineering is primarily concerned with
methods and techniques to both prevent the introduction of, as well as detect and
remove, vulnerabilities prior to release [38]. Empirical software engineering seeks
to understand software quality through experimentation, data collection, and anal-
ysis [87], [43].
Within ESE, mining software repositories (MSR) has emerged as its own area of
research within the last decade [36]. MSR uses artifacts from a software project
for knowledge discovery (e.g. frequent item set and association rule mining) [90]
as well as to support or refute investigative questions (e.g. do last minute changes
introduce vulnerabilities?). Commonly mined artifacts include the software version
control system, bug reports, and mailing lists of software projects [89].
The following sections highlight various concepts and terms from SSE, ESE, and
MSR relevant to this research. After a brief summary of the secure software land-
scape and component based systems, related terminology is discussed. Various
terms such as defect and vulnerability are discussed in the context of this work.
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Finally, a review of related ESE and MSR based prediction work is presented.
2.1 Secure Software Landscape
Implementation level defects (e.g. defects in code) account for approximately half
of all exploited security vulnerabilities [55] and therefore represent an important
class of defects to address for security improvement. Moreover, implementation
level security defects are amenable to static analysis since many of these defects
have surfaced repeatedly over the years, implying the existence of detectable bug
patterns. Such implementation level defects include the notorious buffer overflow
and it’s more general class of input-validation-related defects [84]. In fact, many
such defects are presently detectable by static analysis tools.
Common techniques for determining if one software product is “more secure”
than another involve comparing the number of security advisories logged against
each version in a post-release fashion, with vulnerabilities identified after release.
For example, although looking at completely different things, both Sachitano et
al. [75] and Alhazmi et al. [7] use this post-release approach for source data and
comparison. Furthermore, this post-release advisory counting technique only works
on products from the same product line or that perform identical functions. In the
case of Sachitano et al. [75], noted previously, the security attributes of two mail
programs were being compared. In the case of Alhazmi et al. [7], a model for vulner-
ability discovery rate in subsequent operating system versions was being validated.
2.1.1 Component Based Systems
Large software systems such as Web servers and mobile phones are component
based systems. The reuse of existing components is common in industry. Mod-
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ern software systems are synthesized from pre-existing components, often being
built on an application platform.
By application platforms, we mean a system of software components working
together in order to provide (often tailored and domain specific) capabilities that
form the foundation of modern systems. As such, application platforms are more
than the operating system itself. Linux proper is actually the Linux kernel, but the
term “Linux” is often meant as the application platform including libc, execution
shells, and command line utilities. Colloquially, various application platforms are
informally referred to by their names such as Linux, Windows, Android, and iOS.
These platforms make extensive reuse of pre-existing software modules. Android,
for example, makes use of several large components, including libraries to render
web pages (WebKit), coordinate media playback (Media Framework), render fonts
(FreeType), as well as provide the basic services needed to load and execute programs
(Android Runtime). Figure 2.1, a high level overview provided by Google, shows the
various layers, libraries, and frameworks within the Android application platform.
The use of pre-existing components in modern application platforms is anal-
ogous to viewing icebergs–the integrator cannot see 90% of what lurks below the
surface. The many possible variations and configurations of such modules make
exhaustive dynamic testing nearly unfeasible. Additionally, products aggregating
platform components cannot re-inspect the source every time a new version of a
new module or library is released; as stated previously, developer time is often fo-
cused on implementing new features in new code. Hence, static prediction models
seem well suited to the task of narrowing the vulnerability search space of such
systems.
Predictors that operate on source code and repository information are relevant
to any arrangement where the source code and its repository are openly accessible.
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Figure 2.1: Android architecture
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This arrangement manifests in vertically integrated technology companies as well
as open source projects. Moreover, predictors driven by architectural relations may
be used even when source code is not available.
Architectural relationships, such as function call invocations and variable refer-
ences, can be recovered from linked objects and libraries. Metrics based on link
level relationships can therefore be used when integrating closed source commer-
cial off the shelf (COTS) components. Although link level relationships do require
the software to build and link, many static techniques also impose a similar build
requirement. The build requirement is needed so that static tools can obtain the cor-
rect environmental options and compiler configuration switches used for building
the target executable [20].
2.1.2 Role of Static Analysis Tools
Automated static analysis tools are capable of scanning millions of lines of code,
searching for patterns indicative of programmer mistakes, inefficient code, and error-
prone language features (e.g. such as C’s ‘str’ functions). Such tool capabilities
have proven effective at controlling costs while improving software quality in general
and security in particular [17].
Reviewing code from a security perspective requires a level of expertise in vulner-
ability assessment and attacker-minded thinking that few developers possess [85].
Such expert knowledge, at least with respect to recurring vulnerability patterns, can
be programmed into static analysis tools to help fill the void in software security
expertise. Studies such as [40], [17], and [95] demonstrate the promise of static
analysis tools for detecting many common and high frequency security-related im-
plementation level defects. In [88], Jeannette Wing states that “We have the technical
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solutions in hand to detect or prevent these attacks; so it is a matter of deploying
them in an effective, scalable, and practical way.’ Practical deployment of auto-
mated tools entails understanding (1) how they complement more traditional defect
detection and removal techniques, and (2) how to effectively identify and prioritize
actionable alerts.
Regarding the first point (1), static analysis tools complement other more tra-
ditional techniques such as structured code reviews and manual code inspections.
Wagner et al. [86] showed that manual code reviews catch different types of vulner-
abilities than those caught by automated tools. In addition, Gegick’s work [28] pro-
vides evidence that non-security related defect warnings from static analysis tools
can be used to identify attack-prone components.
Static analysis tools further complement manual review efforts by overcoming
human time and stamina limitations. A human can only visually inspect a fraction
of a project’s code in the time it takes an automated tool to check a project’s en-
tire code-base. Additionally, since multiple code paths are checked simultaneously,
corner cases harboring vulnerabilities are more likely to be uncovered by static anal-
ysis tools than conventional (dynamic) testing techniques [27]. A tool forges ahead,
automatically executing each of its checks against every file; a human performing
similar tedious actions is more likely to tire, increasing the chances for error.
Regarding the second point (2), the question around how to address tool gen-
erated warnings is not always so straightforward, especially for component based
systems. Adding static analysis to an existing software project can unearth several
thousand defects. Administrative questions about code and defect ownership, team
loading, and fix assignment instantly surface. A natural extension of these issues
are questions over which defects developers should fix first.
Although many tools bin detected defects into broad categories such as high,
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medium, and low, these default categories may not be adequate in practice. Heck-
man [37] notes the inadequacy of default prioritization schemes offered by analysis
tools “out of the box”. A fundamental limitation of the default defect prioritization
schemes offered by shrink-wrapped tools is lack of higher level insight into system
structure and context. The default impact classifications may not align with the
domain or operating environment of the software.
The author knows of at least one static analysis tool that classifies program
hangs and data race conditions as a medium priority defects. The classification
as a medium priority defect might be fine for a desktop application that can be reset
or restarted with relative ease. However, resetting or restarting an application is not
feasible (or is at the very least a last resort) for embedded systems. In the context of
medical devices or other critical embedded systems, defects such as program hangs
and data race conditions manifest as serious operational field failures. For example,
the author knows of an automotive system where the driver must turn off the vehicle
and exit the vehicle for two minutes before the system would shut down completely.
Such a sequence is commonly referred to as a key cycle. In such a context, a program
hang would render the automotive system unusable until the driver performed a key
cycle.
2.1.3 Metric Based Prediction Models
Prediction models within ESE typically look at various attributes or properties of a
software file (or its history) as opposed to scanning files line by line for a specific
problematic pattern; in contrast, commercial static analysis tools scan files line by
line for problematic functions, data flow sequences, and control flow sequences. The
various attributes examined by prediction models are often colloquially referred to
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as predictors or indicators, but these attributes, or their derivatives, either form
the explanatory variables in statistical regression models, or form the inputs for
(typically supervised) machine learners. Such attributes are also called features (or
feature vectors in multivariate schemes). The said features typically utilize one or
more code or change measures directly, or are themselves metrics derived from the
same.
In contrast with commercial static analysis tools, which tend to focus on partic-
ular coding practices, or use of problematic functions, ESE defect prediction models
typically approach model building from the standpoint of evaluating metrics with a
bearing on (or that otherwise describe) human factors. For example, as stated in Sec-
tion 1.2, MCC and KLOC can be viewed as representations of cognitive work factor,
quantifying the degree to which code complexity and size exceeds the psycholog-
ical capacity (e.g., short term memory) of the average developer. In other words,
the MCC and KLOC code metrics measure attributes of code that have a bearing on
human information processing and retention capabilities.
Code, Architecture, and Change Metrics In related ESE literature, code metrics typ-
ically refer to file or line level complexity metrics such as McCabe’s Cyclomatic Com-
plexity (MCC), or thousand lines of code (KLOC). Our work, and a few others, make
reference to architectural metrics that characterize various properties of software
dependency, invocation, and data flow graphs. Such architectural metrics might in-
clude, fan-in, fan-out, and various modularity and maintainability metrics noted in
Section 2.2.4. In contrast, change metrics typically refer to historical attributes of
file modifications mined from projects’ VCSs. Promising historical metrics in recent
ESE literature include relative code churn and change bursts.
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Descriptive Capabilities of Change Metrics In addition to also describing com-
plexity in the code change process, change metrics may also be representative of un-
derlying technical or environmental factors impacting developers or the code change
process [35]. For example, several observations of an abnormally high number of
changes to a file or module prior to release might be indicative of one or more of the
following:
• The file (or module) was revised several times because the requirements were
not complete, were ambiguous, or had technical errors. Nagappan et. al [66]
note that requirements may only stabilize after multiple implementation at-
tempts due to the involvement of conflicting organizations.
• The developers working on the file (or module) were not familiar with the file
(or module) and therefore changed it frequently to make corrections as they
gained additional knowledge or discovered faults through additional testing.
• The file (or module) was not adequately tested–repeated changes were therefore
made to the file (or module) as new edge cases were discovered [66].
• The module had so called hairy bugs, only partially fixed with a band aid so-
lution, without understanding true root cause. Therefore, failures resulting
from these defects reappear and result in repeated changes in attempts to fix
the issues [66].
The characteristics and pattern of the changes to the project over defined time
periods (e.g., a week), could also be indicative of various project level issues. Has-
san [35] proposes capturing such patterns by describing the complexity of the code
changes with entropy based measures. He notes that entropy based historical change
metrics may be indicative of various development scenarios:
…a spike in entropy may be due to an influx of developers working on
too many aspects of the system concurrently, or to the complexity of the
code, or to a refactoring or redesign of many parts of the system [35].
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We also reason that change patterns may also be able to reflect time-to-market
pressure. That is, pressure to deliver certain (possibly a highly anticipated) feature
by an agreed delivery date. We characterize time-to-market pressure according to
the size or ambitiousness of the feature, compounded with the urgency and impor-
tance of the feature (i.e., as a distinguishing product feature) to the organization
developing the software. As the ambitiousness or scope of the feature increases,
we might expect more widespread changes to result. As the urgency or importance
increases, we might expect the changes to be more ad hoc, being made under duress,
as opposed to more thoughtfully architected and coordinated changes. Considering
such factors, we might expect time to market pressure to be indicated by frequent,
possibly last minute changes, scattered across multiple files.
Promising Change Metrics: Churn and Change Bursts Using projects’ version con-
trol systems (AKA software repositories), recent ESE studies have been able to ana-
lyze code churn and change bursts with promising results. Code churn refers to the
number of code lines added, deleted, or changed over a specified time interval; a con-
venient time interval specification is often the time between product releases [66].
Change bursts refer to consecutive changes over a period of time [65]. Change
bursts are described by gap and burst size. The gap is the maximum distance (e.g., in
days) between successive changes, such that those changes are considered within the
same burst. The burst size is the minimum number of successive changes required
to be considered a burst. Different change bursts are shown in Figure 2.2, taken
from Nagappan et al. [65].
Recent studies [60,66] consistently find relative code churn outperforming other
more traditional metrics such as MCC and KLOC. The study on change bursts in
Windows Vista by Nagappan et al. [65] was particularly impressive as they found that
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Figure 2.2: Example change bursts with varying gap and burst size parameters [65]
change burst metrics outperformed all previous predictors, such as code complexity,
code churn, and organizational structure as predictors for Windows Vista.
In said studies, performance is evaluated in terms of higher precision and re-
call for statistical logistic regression models and machine learning based classifiers.
Performance for statistical linear regression models is often evaluated in terms of
statistically significant error reduction. Additional details on regression models and
their evaluation can be found in Section 3.2.
2.2 Terminology and Relationships
This section disambiguates and more clearly defines terminology used throughout
the remainder of the work. While clearly defining the use of various terms, relation-
ships among terms is also explained.
2.2.1 Terms in Software Measurement
The terms module and component are often used interchangeably and depending on
context, can represent various levels of granularity; although this work uses com-
ponent in a less rigid sense to denote larger subsystems, such as runtime libraries,
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rendering engines, etc. In contrast, module is formally defined, but the definition is
such that it can be adapted to varying levels of granularity. Note that the varying lev-
els of granularity echo the various levels of entity abstraction observed in software




• commits (i.e., VCS transactions)










This work examines various graph and information theoretic measures relating
to modularity and maintainability. Architectural dependency graphs can be of vari-
ous granularity with nodes depicting individual methods or files, such as call graphs,
with file A invoking methods in file B, to higher level block diagrams, where nodes
represent libraries of functions, services, or even separate binaries. All such exam-
ples fit the formal definition of module outlined by Briand et. al. [22].
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This work follows the basic concepts definitions established by Briand et al. [22]
for systems and modules, modular systems, size, and complexity. In their framework,
cohesion and coupling are measures that only apply to systems that can be decom-
posed into modules. Modules are defined as subsystems within a system S. The sys-
tem S is composed of elements, E, and relations R, where R is a binary relation on E,
(R ⊆ E×E); S =< E,R >. A module, or subsystem of S is defined asm =< Em, Rm >
if and only if Em ⊆ E,Rm ⊆ Em × Em and Rm ⊆ R [22]. This generic and intuitive
framework affords architects and metric designers freedom in choosing both the
particular structure and granularity of partitions defining modules within a system.
As an example, Sarkar et al. [77] use the directory structure of open source projects
such as Apache, Mozilla, and the Linux kernel as the definition of modularity for
their experiments while staying within the framework outlined by Briand et al.
2.2.2 Defects, Faults, and Failures
We make frequent use of the terms defect and vulnerability. Faults and failures
are also frequently mentioned as this research compares and contrasts with other
work. There are various subtleties across the use of these terms in both academic
literature and software development practice. Another fact that has bearing on this
work is that not all defects result in runtime errors, with non-conformance to a
project’s coding standard being a prime example. Below, these terms are outlined
starting with defect, describing some error in software design or code, extending to
the eventual manifestation of a failure.
Defect is one of the most overloaded and loosely used terms in related literature.
For this work, the use of the term defect is synonymous with error or anomaly
as defined by IEEE [41]. The goal of review and testing efforts is to identify and fix
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defects prior to release. Depending on the use of term defect, it can describe a coding
or documentation anomaly found prior to release, or a known defect discovered
after release. This work consistently applies residual defect to denote undetected
anomalies which persist in the software after release.
A defect warning or alert is the notification of the probable likelihood of a defect;
a pre-release time frame is assumed. The term alert is often used when discussing
warnings from a static analysis tool. By contrast, a residual defect refers to an undis-
covered defect that remains in the software after release. A fault occurs when a
residual defect is executed at runtime. If the fault, or the execution of a residual de-
fect, prevents the software from providing its specified service, then such deviation
is termed a failure (or bug) [15].
As previously alluded, there is not necessarily a direct correspondence between
residual defects and failures (also often called field failures). Developers and re-
searchers are often interested those residual defects, and by extension, defect warn-
ings (or predictions) that eventually manifest as runtime failures (or predictions
often indicating runtime failures). In contrast, some tools issue defect warnings
that never manifest as run time failures. For example, tool warnings over stylistic
issues such as or brace placement within the code rarely cause operational failures.
In the context of externally perceived product quality, such stylistic defect warnings
are considered benign. The semantics of program execution are unchanged; the
compiled code is blind to the style of the source code. No runtime failure occurs.
Although such stylistic concerns may help identify non-compliance with a cod-
ing standard, they are unlikely to cause an observable field failure [74]. In terms
of quality metrics, the residual defect density of a software product is an item of
interest since it is these defects that may be executed during system operation and
result in unexpected behavior [47]. The execution of a residual defect commonly
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referred to as a fault. Whether or not such a fault prevents the software from deliv-
ering specified service determines whether or not the fault can be called a failure [15].
Generally, the likelihood of encountering a failure during system operation increases
as residual defect density increases.
2.2.3 Vulnerabilities
This research uses the term vulnerability to indicate an instance of a security related
defect present in the software’s code or architecture. In this work, a security related
defect is contrasted with a more general class of defects impacting product func-
tionality and conformance to requirements. We briefly elaborate on this context and
the use of terms in the larger body of current literature.
Krsul [49] concisely and comprehensively defines vulnerability as “an instance
of a [fault] in the specification, development, or configuration of software such that
its execution can violate the [implicit or explicit] security policy.” The use of fault
follows directly from it’s standard use in dependability literature such as [15]. The
term defect, identical to fault, is used more extensively in risk analysis literature such
as [7] and [13]. Popular SSE literature (e.g [53,54,56]) also favors the use of defect.
This work attempts to consistently use the word vulnerability to label a security
related defect. In this work, defect can be either a functional fault or a security
related fault.
Security assurance is ultimately a subset of software quality assurance [26]. Soft-
ware quality assurance is concerned with assuring that the software conforms to it’s
requirements. Fault-induced failures, ultimately caused by the execution of defects,
prevent the software from meeting specified requirements. In the more general field
of standard-issue software engineering, approaches to improving software quality
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focus on preventing and/or removing defects throughout SLC stages. SSE is con-
cerned with eliminating (or at least reducing) software defects/faults threatening
security; such defects are commonly called vulnerabilities. In this regard, SSE seeks
to improve the quality of security attributes by preventing and/or removing vulner-
abilities throughout the SLC [38].
2.2.4 Entropy and Uncertainty
Entropy characterizes the average degree of uncertainty in a discrete random vari-
able, X. In information theory, entropy, or the Shannon Uncertainty as it is also
called, is often used to determine the average number of bits required to represent,
or encode the range of expected values of X. Shannon Uncertainty is also frequently
referred to in the literature as Shannon Entropy.
Equation 2.1 shows the general Shannon Entropy formula, while Equation 2.2
shows the formula applied to a uniform random distribution. In the case of uniform
random distributions, P(xi) = 1n , because each event is equiprobable, and the
1
n
term can be factored out of the sum. Uniform random distributions model scenarios













Entropy characterizes patterns and redundancy, and as such, is frequently used
to evaluate data compression techniques. The more pattern and structure, the lower
the entropy. As the distribution of the expected values of X approach equiprobabil-
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ity, its entropy likewise increases, reaching maximum entropy for a uniform random
distribution.
Entropy is applicable to various aspects of software and software development.
Entropy calculations performed on various software artifacts can reflect organiza-
tion or discord with respect to software development and maintenance activities,
can characterize architectural structure of the software, or can characterize the po-
tential for data flow at runtime. Moreover, these relationships are relevant to the
context of vulnerability prediction. Section 2.3.2 gives an expanded discussion of
entropy as a software metric and describes its application to this research.
Rao et al. [73] extend the notion of Shannon Entropy to continuous distributions
defining a new measure termed cumulative residual entropy (CRE). The CRE mea-
sure has some attractive properties that we note for reference purposes and that
may find application in this work. In particular, they note that Shannon Entropy is
not sensitive to extreme differences in value and that this fact can be detrimental
in situations where the actual values of a discrete random variable has bearing on
realizing a payoff, such as in a game of chance (or in our case, perhaps line by line
inspection effort). They give the example of two finite sample sets of two discrete
random variables, X and Y , where X = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and Y = {1,2,3,4,5,106},
noting that Y contains a sample value (106) much greater than any item found in X:
106  6. The Shannon Entropy (here using log10 for the log function) is oblivious to
this extreme difference, but CRE is not. CRE has the additional attractive property
that it can be computed from sample data and the computations asymptotically con-
verge to the true values of the underlying distribution. We may consider utilizing




Our study is informed by similar empirical vulnerability and fault prediction studies
by Shin [81], Ayanam [16], Gimothy et. al. [30], and Bozorgi et. al. [21]. Our work
is most closely related to that of Shin and Ayanam, as both researchers investigated
coupling metrics as vulnerability predictors. Shin’s and Ayanam’s respective works
build on a long tradition of complexity metrics used to predict faults. Vulnerability
ranking approaches are informed by the work of Bozorgi et. al.
2.3.1 Metrics Based Fault Prediction
Code Metrics. Several studies [23, 64, 66, 83] have examined the relationship be-
tween residual defects and static metrics extracted from source code. For example,
sheer size of a file in lines of code (LOC), or more commonly in thousands of lines
of code (KLOC), has been studied as having a bearing on residual defects based on
the premise that larger more complex code is more difficult to understand and com-
prehend. By extension, reviews of difficult to understand and comprehend code
are less likely to unearth defects. Another popular metric is McCabe’s Cyclomatic
complexity (MCC) which measures the number of paths through a program. The
premise behind McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity relates to the difficulty in achieving
adequate branch and path coverage during testing.
In the area of fault prediction, Gimothy et al. [30] set several precedents for fault
prediction studies: use of large, real-world open source software, applying linear and
logistic analysis, independent evaluation of univariate predictors, as well as applying
machine learning techniques, and 10-fold cross validation for training and testing.
These staple analysis patterns appear regularly across fault prediction studies, and
by extension, recent vulnerability investigation works as well. Gimothy et al. applied
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the CK [23] metrics suite for objected oriented (OO) software to seven versions of
Mozilla Firefox, covering 3,192 extracted classes. They found high correlation be-
tween the CK CBO metric, coupling between objects, and fault proneness of modules,
with precision and recall values over 0.69 of on predictive models based on CBO.
A related work by Janzen and Saiedian [44–46] considered a large number of soft-
ware architecture metrics to examine the impact of test-driven development (TDD)
on software architecture. Their objective was to provide a comprehensive and em-
pirically sound evidence and evaluation of the TDD impact on software architecture
and internal design quality. They conducted formal controlled experiments in un-
dergraduate and graduate academic courses, in a professional training course, and
with in-house professional development projects in a Fortune 500 company. The
experiments involved over 230 student and professional programmers working on
almost five hundred software projects ranging in size from one hundred to over
30,000 lines of code. The research also included a case study of fifteen software
projects developed over five years in a Fortune 500 corporation. Their research re-
sult demonstrated that software developers applying a TDD approach are likely to
improve some software quality aspects at minimal cost over a comparable test-last
approach. In particular, their research shows statistically significant differences in
the areas of code complexity, size, and testing. These differences can substantially
improve external software quality (defects), software maintainability, software un-
derstandability, and software reusability.
Even though the objective of Janzen and Saiedian’s research was different from
ours, we can benefit from their comprehensive treatment and examination of soft-
ware architecture metrics (e.g., for complexity, coupling, cohesion, size, productivity,
test coverage, class-level interface-level, etc.). For example, for the class-level alone,
they considered some 40 different metrics (e.g., depth of inheritance tree, number
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of instance variables, number of static variables, number of instance methods, num-
ber of static methods, number of primitive methods, etc.). Many of the metrics
studied by Janzen and Saiedian were also studied by Shin [81], noted earlier. The
sheer volume of metrics along with a comprehensive statistical analysis and empiri-
cal methods will be beneficial to our work and will suggest not only various metrics
to consider but also how to combine various statistical indicators to arrive at useful
conclusions.
Change Metrics: Churn and Change Bursts. In the last decade, a large number of
studies have gone past direct code-based attributes to examine how these attributes
change over time as the code is developed. The difference in these more recent stud-
ies is that they are one level removed, extracting metrics from the version control
system rather than from individual files. We refer to such metrics as change metrics
or historical metrics to distinguish them from more traditional static code metrics,
that do not require a VCS for calculation, being directly obtainable from a version
archive of the source code. Two such change metrics are churn, introduced by Mun-
son and Elbaum [63], and change bursts. Note that churn and change burst metrics
each can be decomposed into various metric suites; that is the terms churn and
change burst do not themselves define concrete measures, but apply as a moniker
to the historical traits common to such measures. Below, we summarize related
work in fault prediction and defect estimation inspires our efforts in the context of
vulnerability prediction.
Khoshgoftaar et al. [48] use churn relative to bug changes, as the number of lines
added or changed to fix the bug. Khoshgoftaar used the amount of code changed
along with 16 other static code metrics to build a module fault-proness predictor.
Their case study on two successive releases of a telecommunications system con-
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taining 171 modules with over 38,000 functions yielded precision and recall values
over 78%.
Nagappan and Ball [66] demonstrated how to use relative code churn as an esti-
mator for system defect density. Their case study on Windows Server 2003 showed
that various churn related metrics were able to discriminate between fault-prone and
not fault-prone binaries with an accuracy of 89%.
Moser et al. [60] compared 18 change metrics (called process metrics in their
work) to 31 traditional code complexity metrics in Java source for the Eclipse project.
They used a cost-sensitive prediction model to allow for different costs in prediction
errors. They found that change metrics outperformed the traditional complexity
metrics by a margin of about 10 percentage points for both true positive rate and
recall when using their cost based model. In addition, the models based on change
metrics had nearly half the rate of false positives when compared to the models
based on static code metrics.
Bell, Ostrand, and Weyuker [69] studied change metrics related to individual pro-
grammers. They analyzed change reports filed by 107 programmers for 16 releases
of a system with 1,400,000 LOC and 3100 files. A “bug ratio" was defined for pro-
grammers, measuring the proportion of faulty files in release R out of all files modi-
fied by the programmer in release R-1. The study compares the bug ratios of individ-
ual programmers to the average bug ratio, and assessed the consistency of the bug
ratio across releases for individual programmers. Their results that counts of the
cumulative number of different developers changing a file over its lifetime can help
to improve fault predictions, while other developer counts were not helpful. They
concluded that information related to particular developers were not good predic-
tors.
In another study, Bell, Ostrand, and Weyuker [18] examine several churn metrics,
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such as lines added, deleted, and modified, where churn = added + deleted + changed.
They evaluate the independent predictive capability of several different types of
both relative and absolute churn, using 18 successive releases of a large software
system. They also study the extent to which faults an be predicted by the degree
of churn alone, and in combination with other code characteristics. Their findings
indicate that various churn measures have roughly the same predictive capability.
Bell, Ostrand, and Weyuker conclude that including some change measure from a
prior release, Ri−1, is a critical factor in fault prediction models for release Ri.
Nagappan et al. more recently studied change bursts as predictors of residual
defects in Windows Vista. For their study on Windows Vista, they found that change
burst metrics outperformed all previous predictors, such as code complexity, code
churn, and organizational structure, yielding precision and recall values over 90%
[65].
2.3.2 Entropy Based Software Metrics
As described in Section 2.2.4, entropy characterizes the average degree of uncer-
tainty in a discrete random variable, X, and this also translates in different ways to
a software project. In this section, we review entropy metrics from other works that
we intend to utilize as explanatory variables in our prediction models.
Hassan [35] presents several complexity metrics based on historical changes, cal-
culating entropy for the file modifications within a change period. A change period
(or interval) is a period of time over which files change as a result of development
progress. A fixed calendar time period (e.g., a week) offers the most straightforward
method to establish the change period; however, Hassan presents several different
methods for defining the period. The different period derivation methods result in
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the concept of differing period types. That is, the period types differ with respect to
the method or technique used to define the period. Hassan presents the following
methods for change period derivation:
1. Fixed time: establishing the change period based on a fixed calendar time (e.g.,
a week),
2. Number of modifications: establishing the change period over a fixed number
of file modifications, across all modified files, or
3. Burst pattern: establishing the change period based on the continuity of suc-
cessive changes or lack thereof
Hassan’s entropy based, historically derived measures were shown to out perform
both prior faults and prior modifications as a predictor of future faults for the open
source systems he studied. As mentioned, in addition to his results on entropy based
historical change metrics, Hassan also directly compared the prediction capability
of prior faults and prior modifications.
In addition to his entropy based historical metrics, Hassan found differences
in the prediction capability of prior faults versus the prediction capability of prior
modifications; again, the goal being prediction of future faults. In particular, for his
studied software subjects (NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, Postgres, KDE, and KOffice),
Hassan found that prior faults (as opposed to prior modifications) were a better
predictor of future faults.
These findings are notable since Chowdhury and Zulkernine [24] specifically
found that prior vulnerabilities did not perform well in estimating residual vulner-
abilities; that is, although Hassan found that prior faults were a good predictor of
future faults, Chowdhury and Zulkernine found that prior vulnerabilities were not a
good predictor of future vulnerabilities. Said another way, accurate and precise fault
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prediction models do not always translate to accurate and precise vulnerability pre-
diction models. However, to our knowledge, Hassan’s historical complexity metrics
have not specifically been evaluated for vulnerability prediction.
We will evaluate Hassan’s entropy based historical complexity metrics, HCM , for
vulnerability prediction. We are inspired by existing efforts to re-evaluate fault pre-
diction metrics for vulnerability prediction. In particular, Shin [82], as well as Chowd-
hury and Zulkernine [24], adapt various fault prediction metrics for the purpose of
vulnerability prediction. We feel that entropy based metrics may be especially well
suited for vulnerability prediction since:
• Entropy based historical change metrics outperformed prior faults as a predic-
tor of future faults–in experiments to date, the notion of prior faults predict-
ing future faults hasn’t been empirically supported for vulnerabilities (i.e., past
vulnerabilities have not been shown to be predictors of future vulnerabilities),
• The level of entropy will increase as changes become more scattered across
files and modules,
• The change period can be determined automatically using change bursts, and
• the presence of said change bursts may themselves be indicative of a large
development push or refactoring effort where vulnerabilities may likely be in-
troduced.
Sarkar et al. [77] describe a number of information theoretic metrics that repre-
sent module interactions in a system, or modularity. We submit that the modularity
principles outlined by Sarkar et al. such as similarity of purpose, acyclic dependen-
cies, and encapsulation also characterize the classic security design principles of
Saltzer and Schroeder [76]. The associations between security design principles and
detailed modularity principles enumerated by Sarkar et al. [77] are shown in Table
2.1. For example, Saltzer and Schroeder’s design principle of complete mediation,
where every object access must be checked for proper authority, is enabled by a
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Security Design Principle Modularity Principle
Economy of Mechanism Size
Economy of Mechanism Acyclic Dependencies
Economy of Mechanism Unidirectionality in Layered Architecture
Complete Mediation API-based Inter-Module Call Traffic
Complete Mediation Purpose Dispersion
Complete Mediation Similarity of Purpose
Table 2.1: Related security and modularity principles
design that routes all inter-module call traffic through a well defined API. Sarkar et
al.’s Module Interaction Index, (MII), is a modularity metric characterizing the mod-
ularity principle of maximization of API-based inter-module call traffic–an underlying
principle of encapsulation. MII is the ratio of external calls made to a module’s API
functions relative to the total number of external calls made to the module. LowMII
could indicate direct usage of shared memory or direct global memory references.
We might expect MII to inversely correlate with security vulnerabilities manifest-
ing from unmediated changes to global variables, ultimately characteristic of poor
encapsulation.
Anan et al. [12] discuss how entropy calculations on software data flow relation-
ships can be used to derive a maintainability profile for a given software architec-
ture. In their work, the maintainability profile quantifies the effort needed to modify
a module given a particular architecture. Code modification is modeled uniformly
and randomly across modules, with the probability of modification for any given
module as 1n , where n is the number of modules in the system; however, unintended
side effects of that modification are estimated using the probability of information
flow by using the number of incident edges linking the given module to other mod-
ules in the system. This research investigates if the maintainability of a module can
be used to rank predictions powered by change based metrics. The intuition is that
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change based metrics might generate a number of predictions, based on frequently
changed files. It seems reasonable that changes to files inside of a module, where
said module already high maintainability score (relative to its peers), would be more
likely to cause unintended side affects, simply because there are larger data flows
directed from it to other modules.
Entropy surfaces again in Abdelmoez et al. [6] during analytical derivation mea-
sures for quantifying error propagation probability in a given architecture. Assum-
ing an error injected into a given module, their measure characterizes the likelihood
of it reaching other modules. This is similar in spirit to the maintainability metric,
but seems to hold promise for mirroring propagation of attacker crafted data.
2.3.3 Metrics Based Vulnerability Prediction
Ayanam studied coupling metrics derived descended from the lineage of metrics
inspired by Chidamber and Kemerer [23]. The notion of coupling is embodied in the
some of the metrics from Sarkar et. al. [77] and Anan et. al. [12] that we also investi-
gate. As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, we seek to investigate architectural modularity
metrics that characterize economy of mechanism and Complete Mediation. We are
also interested in information flow metrics, based on the idea that attacks are often
executed by manipulating input data.
As mentioned previously, a closely related study for vulnerability prediction was
provided by Yonghee Shin. The results from Shin’s study indicate that certain change
and developer oriented metrics are able to discriminate between vulnerabilities and
the larger class of standard issue defects. Shin [81,82] examined churn in addition
to several other change metrics mined from software projects’ version control sys-
tems. Shin’s study was likewise focused on security and vulnerability prediction.
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Shin sought to answer whether or not these metrics could also be used to iden-
tify vulnerable files. Shin also examined developer oriented graph metrics. Shin’s
results showed developer oriented metrics and change metrics yielding the best per-
formance on the projects she studied.
2.3.4 Vulnerability Scoring and Ranking
Scoring and ranking vulnerabilities requires expert knowledge about both the sever-
ity and likelihood of exploitation. Various vulnerability rating systems exist to distill
expert knowledge concerning accessibility, ease of exploitation, and severity into a
numeric score or a qualitative classification such as high, medium, or low. Security
advisory organizations such as US-CERT and Secunia provide mailing lists to update
systems administrators on newly discovered vulnerabilities. Systems administrators
use these scoring systems and advisory services to prioritize patches to operational
systems. Although various criticisms exist with respect to using these rating sys-
tems for prioritizing the application of operational patches to running systems, we
consider that the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [57], despite said crit-
icisms, offers a metric usable for the purposes of evaluating our ranking approaches.
The past ten years have seen widespread adoption of the common vulnerability
scoring system (CVSS) as a common and standardized assessment system. CVSS
scores are often included on security advisories from organizations such as US-
CERT, Microsoft, Cisco, and Secunia. These scores are also listed in the on-line
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [68]. Such scores encapsulate expert vulner-
ability knowledge and provide a basis for ranking vulnerabilities. In particular, the
base metric from CVSS represents intrinsic characteristics of a vulnerability as six
components: access vector, access complexity, authentication, and impact to con-
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fidentiality, integrity, and availability. We expand on these notions briefly, more
completely explained in [57] below:
Access vector. Defined by three binary values, < L,A,N > , the access vector re-
flects how a vulnerability is exploited:
• L = local access; attacker must have physical access to the vulnerable system
or a local account
• A = adjacent network access; attacker must be on the same broadcast or col-
lision domain; examples include local IP subnet, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, and
local Ethernet segment
• N = network access; often termed “remotely exploitable", the attacker does not
have to have local or adjacent access
Access complexity. Defined as a qualitative measure of difficulty, the access com-
plexity reflects how difficult it is for the attacker to trigger the vulnerability. Access
complexity can take one of three values: high, medium, or low:
• High (H) = most difficult to trigger; attacker must have elevated privilege, is
easily detectable, or is rarely an issue given the configuration of production
systems
• Medium (M) = somewhat difficult to trigger; scope of attack is limited or con-
fined to untrusted users, requires additional data gathering and surveillance
to launch, or is only present for a limited number of systems given typical
configurations of the same
• Low (L) = easiest to trigger; applicable to a wide range of systems and users,
and is accessible in common or default configurations
Authentication. A qualitative measure indicating the number of times an attacker
must authenticate during and attack. The possible values are:
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• Multiple (M) = requires authentication two or more times
• Single (S) = requires attacker to authenticate once
• None (N) = no authentication required
CIA impact metrics. Three additional metrics quantifying impact on security prop-
erties confidentiality, integrity, and availability (i.e., CIA) are specified with one of
three values. The possible value for impact on each of these properties is specified
as N,P, or C , for none, partial, or complete impact respectively:
• None (N) = there is no impact to the property
• Partial (P)= there is some impact to the property, but it is contained or isolated
• Complete (C) = there property is completely compromised
The above components are rolled up into a single CVSS score. We intend to
evaluate our vulnerability ranking techniques based on architectural metrics against
the order imposed by CVSS base scores. We are aware of the criticisms of CVSS
base scores by Bozorgi et. al. [21] as a standard against which to evaluate ranking,
but we submit that our usage is different in the context of ranking the predictions
of residual vulnerabilities. The following paragraphs recapitulate Bozorgi et al.’s
critique and then compares the differences in the context of our application and
intent.
Bozorgi et. al.’s work also provides a critique of CVSS scores, noting that CVSS is
subject to “categorical magic numbers” and that the score aliases too many details
of the security advisory (from the perspective of prioritizing patch application based
on exploitation likelihood). Further, Bozorgi e.t al. note that derivation of factors
in the CVSS base score is not clear and that there are no empirical investigations of
whether or not CVSS base scores are truly representative of exploitation likelihood.
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The following are important differences between our work and that of Bozorgi
et. al. [21], considering that their work is concerned with prioritizing patch selection
and application to operational systems:
Prediction error: Our prediction models will have some prediction error, such as a
given false positive rate. This factor doesn’t impact Bozorgi et. al. since their
false positive rate with respect to this dimension is 0; that is, they already know
the vulnerability exists, as well as the fix.
Time independence: Bozorgi et. al. notes a significant difference on exploitation
likelihood based on time.
Bozorgi et. al. [21] focus on the classification of a vulnerability as exploited or
not exploited in order to train a support vector machine (SVM) learner to predict
likelihood of exploitation. Their work is different than ours as their focus is not
on the software itself, but the vulnerability reports, such as listed in the NVD [68].
Their work recognizes that although a vulnerability may be found, there may be
little interest from attackers in developing its exploit. The interest of their work
is in prioritizing the application of patches by software vendors. Our interest, in
contrast, is in prioritizing the creation of those patches, from the perspective of a
software vendor. Rather than advisory reports, our inputs consist of architectural
features.
A key difference between our context and that of Bozorgi et al. discussed above
is that of time. In their work, the age of a vulnerability was a significant factor
in determining exploitation likelihood–attackers may be less likely to exploit a vul-
nerability the older it gets, since, it is reasonable that system administrators may
have already patched older vulnerabilities. In contrast, our context is one where
any vulnerability could potentially be a zero day exploit. A residual vulnerability is
by definition a vulnerability that evades detection and persists in released software.
45
Despite the criticisms of CVSS, we submit that our context is different and use CVSS
as an evaluation of rankings created from modularity and maintainability metrics.
In addition to Bozorgi, a number of works [8–11, 61, 62, 91–94] either further
dissect the suitability and adequacy of CVSS scores, or discuss the relationship be-
tween CVSS scores and the concept of severity related to exploited vulnerabilities.
We elaborate on these more recent and notable works since many of the ideas share
common themes with our research (i.e., discuss CVSS scores) and draw upon similar
background concepts such as likelihood of exploitation that naturally follow from
examination of DaCosta et al.’s [25] Front Line Functions and Manadhata’s Attack
Surface Metric [51].
Allodi, Luca, Massacci, and Fabio [9, 10] study the accuracy of CVSS scores in
capturing risk/severity when compared against additional exploit databases con-
structed from compiling exploits in the wild into (1) their EKITS database, as well
as (2) those available from Symantec’s Threat Database and the Exploit-db. They
conclude that CVSS is not an appropriate representation of risks stemming from
exploits in the wild because it unfairly favors exploits and proof-of-concept code
found in exploit kits.
Allodi, Shim, and Massacci [8] additionally explore black market trading activity
as it relates to vulnerability exploits, as an indicator of risk (aka severity) to Internet
users. That is, the existence of an exploit on the black market represents security
risk to users of the targeted software. In [11] they find that largest risk reductions
result from fixing security vulnerabilities based on their presence and availability on
the black market.
Let it be noted that we decided to utilize CVSS v2 [57] at the earliest stages of
our research despite known criticisms as discussed in previous paragraphs. We fur-
ther note that we moved forward with CVSS v2 because it is a tangible embodiment
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of expert security knowledge lending itself directly to automation, which was a key
practical consideration for our work. In fact, despite their criticism of CVSS, You-
nis et al. acknowledge that “CVSS metrics are the de facto standard for measuring
the severity of vulnerabilities” [93]. The characteristic of CVSS scores being directly
amenable to automation will further be shown in later chapters where we detail our
approach to training set construction which leverages CVSS scores to automatically
ascribe vulnerability severity. Moreover, we note development of improved stan-
dards such as CVSS v3 that compensate for shortcomings [34] in CVSS v2. Therefore,
despite criticisms leveled against CVSS v2, we have confidence that better scoring
schemes (such as CVSS v3) could be directly substituted for CVSS v2 scores used in
our approach. Finally, it may be possible to better combine our traditional complex-
ity metrics, VCS-centered change metrics, and architectural metrics in our approach
with techniques and methods elaborated in the aforementioned recent works that
share similar background ideas, albeit different research goals.
A common theme within the aforementioned works is the relationship with avail-
able (or potentially available) malicious exploits targeting vulnerabilities and the no-
tion of whether or not patching is required. As noted previously, exploit consider-
ation and patch timing were considerations for the research conducted by Bozorgi.
We feel it is important to differentiate our work by pointing out that (1) we do not
consider existence of exploits in our quantification of severity, and (2) our research
relies on call graph metrics (and Front Line Functions) only to the extent required
to compute architectural modularity metrics; that is, we do not directly attempt to
further quantify reachability. Again, we reiterate that our research questions are
more closely aligned with earlier design and implementation phases of the SDLC
than with the later operational and maintenance phases. That is, our research ques-
tions seek to better understand human factors possibly responsible for vulnerability
47
introduction prior to release as opposed to assessing likelihood of attacker exploita-
tion after release. The metrics we’ve selected embody some elements of reachability
which is a theme most prominently appearing in the work of Younis, Malaiya, and
Ray [93,94]. Any reachability thus captured is implied only, resulting as a byprod-
uct of architectural metric calculation (i.e., since such calculations depend on call
graph information). However, outside our selected architectural metrics, we do not
attempt to directly refine or quantify reachability.
We conclude this section by reiterating that CVSS scores are already widely used
and are available directly on, or directly cross-referenced from, various vulnerabil-
ity advisory systems. These advisory systems, along with vulnerability databases
(i.e., NVD) constitute the source of our training and evaluation data. Therefore, a
natural extension of classification (e.g., file (module) is vulnerable) for vulnerability
prediction is to utilize these available scores, encapsulating expert knowledge, for
the purpose of ranking vulnerability predictions generated by our prediction models.
2.4 Background Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of related terms and concepts relevant to
the intersection of empirical software engineering and secure software engineering.
We’ve also noted work by others in the area of empirical software engineering re-
search and have discussed the difference between code metrics and change metrics.
As noted in Section 1.3, to our knowledge, entropy based architectural maintain-
ability and modularity metrics have not yet been studied from the context of vul-
nerability prediction. These metrics seem promising not only for their potential to
help us in vulnerability prediction, but in terms of understanding other factors in





Vulnerability Prediction Modeling and
Evaluation
This chapter describes the detailed steps involved in building and evaluating predic-
tion models. We discuss particular approaches to ranking and classification, as well
as evaluation of the same. The following sections provide detail on regression mod-
els, metric correlation Analysis, and evaluation. Evaluation is relative to expected
reduction in inspection effort, as well as rank correlation with advisory CVSS [57].
3.1 Building ESE Prediction Models
Shröter, Zimmerman, and Zeller [80], along with Nagappan, Ball, and Zeller [67],
as well as Chowdhury and Zulkernine [24], clearly describe the process of building
predictive classification and ranking models based on post-release defects. They
differentiate between classification, a primarily binary relation, and ranking which
provides a partial or total order among predictions based on a scoring function.
Shröter, Zimmerman, and Zeller largely adhere to ESE model building process out-
lined by Nagappan, Ball, and Zeller [67]. Nagappan, Ball, and Zeller outline prescrip-
tive steps for model building and specifically explain how to carry out the process
using post-release defects, which is relevant to our approach. Their model build-
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Figure 3.1: Prediction system data and processing
ing process is relevant because we are using security advisory reports to identify
residual vulnerabilities. Residual vulnerabilities are a subset of the more general
post-release defects (i.e., used in the predictive model building process). We list the
following prescriptive steps,from Naggappan, Ball, and Zeller, along with our own
embellishments (also depicted in Figure 3.1), to describe the process of building
prediction models for a project:
1. Collect input data from bug databases (i.e., ITS), VCS, and project source code.
These data sources and processing steps are graphically depicted in Figure 3.1.
Note that the version archives can be obtained by obtaining source snapshots
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from the project VCS, typically by checkout operation specifying a “tag” corre-
sponding to each release.
2. Map post-release advisories to vulnerabilities in entities, where entities can
represent any number of software artifacts or components (e.g., requirements,
modules, files, lines, etc.). Our entities consist of files, modules, and layers.
Note that in order to carry out the mapping, we will have to provide additional
input describing higher level architectural groupings. The most straightfor-
ward example of such additional input would be a list of module and layer
associations: the additional input encodes a list of layers, L = {L1, . . . Ln}, and
module assignment to each layer; ML(i) = {m|m ∈ Li}.
3. Compute metrics and extract facts using the source code, VCS, and fact extrac-
tion tool (e.g., UnderstandC++). Fact extraction occurs on the file level using
UnderstandC++. Module and layer relations are used to sum extracted facts at
the module level. Fact extraction results are fed into the architectural modu-
larity and maintainability calculations detailed in Section 3.8. The end results
of said calculations are stored in the TEDB.
4. Determine relevant attributes (metrics) using techniques such as analysis of
variance (ANOVA) [59], information gain [31], or principal component analysis
(PCA) [32]. PCA is used to remove attributes that are inter-correlated (exhibit
multicollinearity). Multicollinear attributes must be removed when applying
linear regression, otherwise large standard errors and incorrectly apportioned
coefficients may result. Section 3.2 discusses linear regression in more detail.
5. Generate predictions using relevant attributes. At this final step, we utilize
the TEDB to train and evaluate various machine learners. In this step, we also
examine performance of the prediction model, using various performance eval-
uation metrics discussed in Section 3.4.
The above steps, 1–4, are repeated for several versions (releases) of a product.
The end result, over several versions of a product, is a completed training and eval-
uation database (TEDB). Each record in the TEDB contains several metrics computed
per release. This database is then used to build prediction models by using statisti-
cal techniques (e.g. least squares regression) and machine learning classifiers on a
portion of the collected data (e.g, the training data). After the prediction models are
built, a different portion of the collected data (e.g. the evaluation or test data) is used
to test the predictions generated by the models. Since the test data is already labeled
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as “vulnerable” (Vuln+) or “not vulnerable” (Vuln−), a confusion matrix relating the
accuracy of the predictions to the actual values can be generated.
Actual
Positive, + Negative, – Total
Predicted
Positive, + TP FP TP + FP
Negative, – FN TN FN + TN
Total TP + FN FP + TN N
Table 3.1: Detailed confusion matrix
In Table 3.1, note that N represents the total number of samples (e.g., files or
modules). The following show various counts and ratios used in the evaluation of
the prediction (or classification as vulnerable):
N = Countsamples = Count+actual + Count−actual (3.1)
Count+actual = TP + FN (3.2)
Count−actual = FP + TN (3.3)
Equation 3.1 shows the total number of samples, N, expressed from the perspec-
tive of the labeled oracle.
N = Countsamples = Count+predicted + Count−predicted (3.4)
Count+predicted = TP + FP (3.5)
Count−predicted = FN + TN (3.6)
Equation 3.4 shows the total number of samples, N, expressed from the perspec-
tive of the generated predictions.
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3.2 Linear and Logistic Regression
This section provides a brief review of linear and logistic regression as these statis-
tical regression techniques are used extensively in both evaluating individual pre-
dictors and serving as a prediction model. In our context, linear regression can be
used to estimate the number of residual vulnerabilities in a file or a module from
either a single explanatory variable (known as simple linear regression) or multi-
ple explanatory variables (known as multiple linear regression). Logistic regression,
on the other hand, serves as a binary classifier, mapping the the response of the
dependent variable into one of two classes:
Vuln+ – a file or module contains one or more vulnerabilities
Vuln− – a file or module is assumed to be neutral with respect to vulnerabilities
Simple Linear Regression Simple linear regression (SLR), also known as least squares
regression, shown in Equation 3.7, is used extensively in fault prediction literature to
perform univariate evaluation of individual metrics, calculating β1 so as to minimize
the sum of squared residuals (
∑n
i=1(yi − xi)2), where residuals are the difference
between sampled observations of the dependent variable y and the explanatory
variable x.
y = β0 + β1x (3.7)
Multiple Linear Regression Multiple linear regression is an extension of SLR for
more than one variable. Rather than attempting to fit a single line to minimize
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error, multiple coefficients inside β are used to fit X to Y .
Y = β0 + βX (3.8)
Shin [81], as well as Chowdhury and Zulkernine [24] note the danger of imbalances
in the training data and resulting impact on regression based models. Essentially,
since there are far fewer instances of training entries labeled as vulnerable, Vuln+,
than those labeled as not vulnerableVuln−, there is a danger of overfitting the model
to the non-vulnerable classification. That is, the regression line comes to favor the
training class of higher cardinality.
Shin refers to this phenomenon as the “needle effect”, referencing the analogy
that finding a vulnerability is like finding a needle in a haystack, and thus conveys the
notion that far fewer“needles”, or training samples labeled as Vuln+ are available for
training. Shin presents a graph depicting the distribution of vulnerabilities, faults,
and neutral files in Firefox. Shin’s data show that, at least for Firefox, files labeled as
vulnerable account for less than 6% of the total dataset–363 files out of 11,051 [81].
The danger of failing to account for the “needle effect" in vulnerability predic-
tion is that the learned models will generally suffer more false negatives and lower
precision if the training data is not somehow balanced. In both cases above, the
researchers provide balance by randomly sampling a subset of training data labeled
not vulnerable, Vuln−. The number of Vuln− items randomly sampled is set equal
to the number of available vulnerable, Vuln+, items.
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3.3 Correlation Analysis
With our data sets sanitized and labeled, we will compute the Pearson correlation co-
efficient [59], r , for each of our architectural modularity and maintainability metrics,
for each version, with respect to the number of advisories logged against affected




i=1 (Xi − X̄)(Yi − Ȳ )√∑n
i=1(Xi − X̄)2
√∑n
i=1(Yi − Ȳ )2
(3.9)
The Pearson correlation coefficient enables us to test for any relationships be-
tween the independent variable, our architectural metrics, and the dependent vari-
able, number of vulnerabilities per module. We will be looking for values above
0.5.
We also examine the Spearman rank order correlation [59], ρ (Equation 3.10),
between a module’s various architectural metrics (xi) and the sum of CVSS scores
(yi) for any advisories logged against the module for each release.
ρ =
∑





Notice we use the form of Spearman correlation, ρ that accounts for tied ranks.
Given the limited range of CVSS values, we reason that we could have several results
“bin" to identical ranks.
56
3.4 Evaluating Classification Performance: P , R, and FPrate
Precision, recall, false positive rate, and F-measure are often used in the evaluation
ESE prediction models (as well as machine learning and information retrieval) [52].
This section provides the equations for these evaluation metrics and reasons about
their application.
These metrics characterize the quality of the prediction models relative to the
confusion matrix (Refer to Table 3.1). As such, they yield results on the quality of
the prediction, characterizing how often a prediction model was correct, with how
often it was wrong.
Precision, P , shown in Equation 3.11, is a measure of the correctly predicted




TP + FP (3.11)
Precision on its own can be misleading, because it ignores false negatives, or
samples actually containing a vulnerability that go undetected by the prediction
model. The model fails to classify the sample as Vuln+. This phenomenon is also
frequently called a type II error. As an extreme case, consider a model that predicts
only one real vulnerability and misses all the others out of 100 vulnerable samples.
In this case, there is no misclassification; FP = 0. Therefore, the precision in this
extreme example is 1, implying that the model correctly classified 100% of samples it
detected as being vulnerable. This example, although extreme, provides motivation
for defining Recall.
Recall, R:, or true positive rate is shown in Equation 3.12
R = TP
TP + FN (3.12)
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Recall, R, (also called sensitivity) provides intuition as to how likely it is that a pre-
diction model will detect a Vulnerability prone file, assuming the real data actually
does contain a a vulnerability. Recall is used in conjunction with precision, P , and a
false positive rate, FPrate, to characterize the performance of a classifier.





FP + TN (3.13)
The false positive rate indicates how likely it is that a prediction model will flag
a file or other entity as vulnerable, when it really is not. Note that cost and penalty
functions can be derived from the false positive rate, since we would not know a
priori which modules our prediction model would have us inspect further.
F-measure, is show in in Equation 3.14.
F = (β
2 + 1)PR
β2P + R (3.14)
β2 = 1− a
a
(3.15)
The F-measure, yields a value between 0 and 1, indicating the balance of precision
to recall for the prediction model. The beta parameter, when set to 1, equally favors
precision and recall; so common is this configuration that the F-measure is often
just denoted as F1. Increasing beta above 1 favors recall. Conversely, decreasing
beta below 1 favors precision [52].
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3.5 Evaluating Ranking Performance: ρ and ROC
Ranking prediction results for inspection is a further optimization in inspection
effort reduction. Firstly, we require that the prediction model has identified a set
of entities (e.g., files in our case) as vulnerability prone; that is, it is believed that
the entity contains at least one residual vulnerability. However, rather than simply
provide a large list of files to the development team to triage and inspect, we can
attempt to rank the predictions. However, in order to rank items relative to one
another, we need a measure of severity which is to our context and application,
what relevance is to Information Retrieval.
In Information Retrieval (IR), there is some distance measure that approximates
the relevance of documents resulting from a user query. Precision, P and recall R in
an IR system are binary evaluations of relevance, respectfully indicating the fraction
of retrieved documents that are relevant, and the fraction of relevant documents that
are retrieved (i.e. retrieved from the entire corpora). However, given the enormity
of the document space, it is common for millions of documents to be returned. The
user, issuing a query, typically does not desire to inspect each document retrieved.
Therefore, IR systems have adopted various measures of relevance in order to put
those items of greatest relevance at the top of the list returned to the user. We
submit that the commercial development context could make use of an analogous
relevance measure for vulnerabilities.
To our knowledge, no other work has proposed a ranked inspection for vulner-
ability predictions. Our conjecture as to why ranked inspection has not been dis-
cussed in the context of security is that the forces of time and delivery schedule in a
commercial development environment have not been completely considered. That
is, the few researchers who have explored vulnerability prediction emphasize the
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importance of recall to ensure that type II errors are minimized. While we appre-
ciate the importance of correctly detecting all vulnerability prone modules, it must
also be recognized that the vulnerabilities themselves may be of varying severity and
that management may not desire to expend development resources on such tasks
considering that prediction models have some false positive rate. In a commercial
context, developers are likely to be tasked with more deterministic tasks that more
directly impact the bottom line. That is, chasing possible security vulnerabilities will
likely lose out to more well defined tasks developing differentiating features.
In a commercial context, project managers often have to make so called go/no-
go decisions to ship software or hold it back because of known defects. However,
because residual vulnerabilities are by definition undetected, it is not likely, even
with prediction models such as ours, that a product would be held back because
the predictive model indicated vulnerability-prone files. Reasoning based on our
experience working professionally in a commercial context for over fifteen years, a
manager would not push back a ship date simply because there was a possibility that
a vulnerability exists. A parallel for this line of thinking and justification can also be
drawn from practices surrounding static analysis tools, as described in Section 2.1.2,
which also often highlight security defects. Because of the aforementioned indeter-
minate nature of static methods, and the potential to waste valuable development
resources on false positives, the field of static analysis tools has come up with alert
prioritization schemes around a backlog of defects; See sec:role-static-analysis-tools.
In summary, we assert that industrial application of vulnerability prediction mod-
els would likely benefit from a quality prioritization scheme. What exactly fits our
IR relevance analogy in the context of vulnerability prediction is likely a rich topic
for future research. For now, we satisfy ourselves with proposing a module based
ranking approach, evaluated based on strength of correlation (ρ) with CVSS base
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metrics.
As an aside, we also considered calculating a more complex rank-order metric
such as Mean Average Precision, or MAP [52] from IR. However, Given that MAP is an
IR rank order metric, some re-interpretation of its parameters such as information
need q provides an interesting thought exercise. Essentially, in our context, we have
one query, “find vulnerable files”. The effect of a single information need effectively
reduces MAP to a Precision@K metric [52] because |Q| = 1 for a single query.
However, this exercise sparks new ideas for how one might go about searching a
code base for specific types of security vulnerabilities or security violations; in other
words, we could leverage more of IR to satisfy queries like “show me potential secu-
rity violations related to cross site scripting (XSS)", or “show me potential security
violations with respect to use of cryptography".
Figure 3.2 shows an ROC curve. ROC stands for relative operator characteristic,
and is a way to visualize Recall (sensitivity) as FPrate is allowed to vary. Good pre-
diction models, returning ranked results will be indicated by ROC curves that rise
sharply on the left, keeping type II errors low as well as the false positive rate. Cal-
culating the area under the ROC curve provides a way to compare different ranking
approaches and quantifies recall over a spectrum of parameter settings for ranked
results. For example, one could derive an ROC plot by evaluating different recall and
FPrate values as the K, in Precision@K is varied.
3.6 Metrics Extracted and Calculated
This section details the various metrics we intend to collect, discussing the impli-
cations of using the various metrics for residual vulnerability prediction. Although
we are primarily interested in evaluating architectural and change based metrics, we
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Figure 3.2: Example ROC curve
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also include some traditional code metrics such as McCabe’s and KLOC for baseline
evaluation and comparison to past studies.
3.7 Notation
The following sections elaborate on the various metric categories, providing metric
calculation formulas. The formulas are dependent on a notation for a software sys-
tem, S. Note that we combine various notation schemes from Sarkar et. al. [77] and
Hassan [35]:
• S consists of a set of modules, M = {m1,m2, . . .mM}, where |M| = M , the
number of modules.
• Functions in S are F = {f1, f2, . . . fF}, where |F| = F , and it is assumed that
the functions are distributed over the set ofM modules.
• f a denotes a function that belongs to a module’s API.
• L denotes a set of layers {L1, . . . Lp}.
• K(f) denotes calls made to function f . Kext(f ) denotes the number of calls to
a file from other modules. Kint(f ) denotes calls made from within the same
module, and where K(f) = Kext(f )+Kint(f ).
• Kext(m) is the number of external function calls made to modulem. A module
with f1 . . . fn functions will have Kext(m) =
∑
f∈{f1...fn}Kext(f )
• K̂(f ) is the total number of calls made by function f .
3.8 Architectural Modularity Metrics
The architectural modularity metrics presented in this section quantify modularity
principles enumerated by Sarkar et al [77]. The modularity metrics quantify mod-
ularity principles that may likewise impact security properties. The module inter-
action index, MII, for example, quantifies the extent to which external calls to a
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module, honor the API provided by the module, as opposed to calling directly into
private functions and methods. The MII measures the portion of all calls made to
a module that are also routed through that module’s API. We submit that such a
property is also useful for security. The following paragraphs frame this concept
more concretely using a hypothetical authorization module as an example.
Consider a module that is responsible for handling authorization. It is possible
for the MII values to range between 0 and 1: 0 ≤ MII(authorization) ≤ 1. An
authorization module withMII of 0 implies that the module is either not being used,
or that any users of the module are bypassing the authorization module’s API. In the
ideal case,MII = 1, indicating that all calls to the authorization module in fact utilize
that module’s API.
In general, we theorize that MII values closer to 0, and perhaps below some
project specific threshold, are inversely correlated with security advisories and patches
involving a module or its called functions, even if the module is not directly related
to a security feature or function. Unintended side effects resulting from system
maintenance or modification would be more likely since encapsulation is violated.
Such side effects have the potential to violate security.
An example would be a module maintaining a processing state, perhaps repre-
senting progress through an online game, where the progress state is updated by
non-API (private) module functions; in other words, the module utilizes internal
function calls to update the internal state. It is possible that although the module
is not specifically labeled as security related, an attacker could carry out attacks on
the methods or functions directly calling the private state update functions to gain
unfair advantage in the game. In online games, such cheating may impact other
gamers financially, since they are often purchasing (with real money) such advan-
tage via virtual goods like special weapons or shielding; in other words, cheating
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would devalue in-game currency. In this case, although the module is not specifi-
cally related to a security feature or function of the software, it nevertheless has the
potential to impact the integrity of the game currency; by extension, any exchange
rate between real world currency and game currency is similarly impacted.
The following equations utilize the notation from Section 3.7 to describe relevant
metrics:







Rationale: The MII was discussed extensively in at the introduction to Section
3.8.




n∗ k ; 0ifn = 0 (3.17)
Rationale: APIU gives an indication regarding the maturity and degree to which
the module has been vetted. Modules providing a large collections of unused
cryptography routines would likely have low APIU . We expect this metric to
inversely correlate with vulnerabilities, especially those related to use of cryp-
tography. A change in a project that introduces a call into such a module to use
a previously unused cryptography routine would be treading new territory; the
newly called routine is assumed to not have the operational time represented
by other public functions in the module.
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3.9 Change and Churn Metrics
Unless otherwise stated, when referring generically to churn, we mean the sum total
of additions, deletions, and modifications. That is:
Churn(E) = NumItemadditions +NumItemdeletions +NumItemmodifications .
As an example:
Churn(FILE) = NumLinesAdded +NumLinesdeleted +NumLinesModified.
NumberOfChanges – Number of releases, or commits in which the entity E, (e.g.,
the file or module), has changed.
Rationale: There is support from fault prediction studies showing that the
more a component changes, the more likely it is to have defects; we evaluate
this notion in the context of vulnerability prediction. Access to a VCS provides
a fine granularity since each check-in (i.e., “commit") can be counted. When
only version archives are available, the count is limited to detected changes
across snapshots.
ChurnTotal – Total churn over the lifetime of an entity E, i.e., churn(E). Rationale:
We assume that the more has changed, the higher the likelihood defects will
be introduced.
3.10 Change Burst Metrics
Change Bursts represent a family of metrics, characterized by change bursts, CB(G,B),
with gap, G, and burst B parameters (See Section 2.1.3). We may refer to the change
burst as simply CB, without the parameters (G, B, in cases where we are discussing
concepts and the particular parameter settings are unimportant. The notationbursts(E)
corresponds to the bursts for element E. That is, element E has a change history
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E = 〈e1, e2, . . .〉 and its bursts are bursts(E) = 〈B1, B2, . . .〉. The following are burst
metrics presented by Nagappan et al. [65], adapted slightly for our context:
NumberOfConsecutiveChanges – Number of consecutive builds, versions, or re-
leases for a given gap size, G. This is |bursts(E)|, with B = 0. Rationale:
Accounts for all consecutive changes for a given gap size.
NumberOfChangeBursts – Number of change bursts corresponding to a particular
gap, G, and burst size, B. The cardinality of CB, or |bursts(E)|. Rationale:
Burst patterns are indicative of risky behavior.
TotalBurstSize – Number of changed builds/versions/releases in all change bursts,
i.e.
∑
B∈bursts(E) |B|. Rationale: Assuming that change bursts indicate risky
activities, a high number of changes during these bursts could be particularly
risky.
Churn-Burst Metrics In the following definitions, let churn(ei) be the number of
lines that were added, deleted, or modified during the changes to the entity ei. By
extension, let us also apply churn to sets, as in churn(E) =
∑
ei ∈ Echurn(ei) [65].
TotalChurnInBurst – Total churn in all change bursts, i.e., churn(bursts(C)). Ratio-
nale: The amount of change involved may be particularly predictive.
MaxChurnInBurst – Across all bursts, this is the maximum churn,max{|churn(B)||B ∈
bursts(E)}. Rationale: Looking for extremes across change bursts.
3.11 Entropy Based, Historical complexity metrics
A Family of metrics, presented by Hassan [35], denoted as HCM , that utilize the
entropy of files changed over a change period. Note that the change period can be
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established as a burst with a gap and burst size. Higher values in these metrics
reflect more scattered and widespread changes. Lower values of HCM correspond
to smaller, more isolated changes to a few files. We expect that more widespread
and scattered changes, characterized by larger HCM values, will be more likely to
introduce vulnerabilities.
3.12 Code Metrics
The code metrics included here are less extensive than other studies. We include
some of the better performing coupling and complexity metrics for comparison
with other studies. Metrics are also selected based on our conjectures regarding
how these metrics might be compared with our architectural modularity and main-
tainability metrics. For example, we include the Henry Kafura (HK) metric because
it mirrors the information flow concept also embodied in Anan et al.’s [12] module
maintainability index, MMI.
In general, we are interested in metrics that have the potential to characterize
information flow through entities such as functions, files, and modules, as well as
complexity metrics that might provide barriers to human comprehension. We rea-
son that security vulnerabilities may manifest as the combination of information
flow and difficulties in comprehension, such as defects introduced unknowingly by
developers because parameter passing or variable accesses from one function (or
module) to another is dubious or suspect. An example of a suspect variable access
would be indirect access to global variables. Below are a list of code metrics we are
interested in:
SLOC: Lines of source code is a size based complexity metric related to human
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comprehension–the larger the code, the more difficult it is to modify with-
out introducing an error; included because of all various metrics it is one of
the oldest and most studied complexity metrics. Moreover, SLOC is one of the
easiest metrics to compute.
McCabe: McCabe’s complexity metric for comparison with similar studies.
FanIn: An information flow metric indicative of the number of inputs into a function.
Any global variables read by the function are included in the count. This metric
is of interest since many attacks are carried out by specially crafted attacker
input. The more paths existing for such input therefore increases likelihood
of exploitation.
FanOut: An information flow metric indicative of the output from a function. Any
global variables written by the function are included in the count. This metric is
of interest since it hints at the potential for errors in one function to propagate
outward to other functions, causing unintended side effects, especially with
respect to global variables.
Nesting: A complexity metric indicating the depth of control statements handling
conditional evaluation and looping if, else, do, while, switch. Deeply
nested control structures may lead to developer error. We posit that such
errors may likely include omissions of authorization checks, or cases that in-
advertently “fall through” to logic that may ultimately enable security compro-
mise.
HK: Henry Kafura metric, HK, is an structural complexity metric indicative of the
information flow through functions or modules. HK = SLOC × (FanIn ×
FanOut)2 [24]. The HK metric is interesting because it characterizes informa-
tion flow through a function. As mentioned previously, many attacks attempt
to manipulate input.
3.13 Model and Metrics Summary
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of model building and have described
the metrics collected by our study. In so doing, we have have outlined the theoretical
basis and rationale for our study. Along the way, we have attempted to provide




Detailed Repository Mining Approach
In this chapter, we examine the problem more deeply, providing details relevant to
our approach. After a brief overview is provided, we detail the steps used to carry
out our investigation and specify the output or goal of each step. As the steps are
enumerated, key constructs, equations, tools, and resources are identified.
4.1 Investigation Overview
This work is an exercises in basic research that builds upon empirical benchmarking
and established empirical software engineering (ESE) precedents from mining soft-
ware repositories (MSR) and sensitivity analysis. A rich history of fault and vulner-
ability prediction literature utilize a post-release analysis approach on open source
software (OSS) projects. Researchers mine project repositories such as issue tracking
systems (ITS) and software version control systems (VCS) using information about
known and fixed vulnerabilities as an oracle.
Using data from the project ITS (e.g., Bugzilla) and VCS (e.g., git), researchers
trace bug reports back to particular file revisions and software releases. The bug
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reports, along with affected files, enable researchers to build a training and evalua-
tion database (TEDB) where each record consists of a file (or other entity of interest),
various metrics, and a classification label of “defective” (or“vulnerable"). Generally
speaking, a classification of defective (Defective+) is applied to a file (or other en-
tity) if its code underwent modification when resolving a field failure logged in the
ITS. A classification of vulnerable(Vuln+) is applied to a file if its code underwent
modification as the result of patching a vulnerability noted in a published advisory.
The training and evaluation database (TEDB) is, in data mining terms, a data
mart [33], although it is not typically referred to as such in current ESE literature.
However, we note that the TEDB fits the definition of a data mart as it is used to
aggregate data from various external data sources to support overall knowledge
discovery in the field of ESE and MSR.
The TEDB is used to produce a confusion matrix for evaluation of generated pre-
diction models. The confusion matrix is used to evaluate the precision, recall (sensi-
tivity), and false positive rate of the predictive model against the file corpora relative
to a given classification, e.g. “file f is vulnerable”. A confusion matrix is shown in
Table 4.1. The confusion matrix summarizes the number of correct and incorrect
classifications generated by the prediction model relative to the real classifications
of the actual samples. These numbers (e.g. true positives and false negatives) are
used to derive various performance measures (e.g., precision and recall) that together
describe the performance of the prediction model. Disciplines outside of computer
science refer to this type of statistical evaluation as sensitivity analysis.
A k-fold cross validation technique is often used for model evaluation as re-
searchers often use the same (limited) data set for both training and predictive
evaluation. Note that since there are often significantly fewer vulnerabilities than
standard-issue defects, the k-fold cross validation technique is more often used for
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Actual
Positive, + Negative, –
Predicted
Positive, + TP FP
Negative, – FN TN
Table 4.1: Example confusion matrix
evaluation in studies focused on vulnerability prediction. In general, largely ow-
ing to the diversity among software domains and projects, such learned models are
not transferable, but are instead relevant only to the project from which they were
trained.
At this time, several well established repositories [78] supporting empirical eval-
uation exist, as well as tools facilitating analysis and mining activities. These estab-
lished tools and repositories support existing, published studies against which this
research may also be compared. This research evaluates security in a post-release
fashion, evaluating specific software repositories against vulnerabilities reported in
corresponding issue tracking systems.
4.2 Research Steps
The following sections document the detailed steps performed in our investigation.
In order to extract items of interest, we perform several preprocessing steps to con-
struct the TEDB, shown in Figure 4.1. After constructing the TEDB, we analyze and
evaluate the gathered data using a variety of statistical and machine learning tech-

































4.2.1 Acquire Study Subjects
Our study subjects are selected due to their significance and relevance, source code
accessibility, and popularity among ESE researchers. Our study subjects are large,
widely used, real world software projects. Moreover, many of these projects are
widely deployed across the Internet and are used by non profit, government, and
commercial organizations. Finally, several other researchers in ESE have also used
the following open source projects:
Mozilla Firefox: a free and open source Web browser with over a hundred million
users world wide [2].
Apache HTTP Server: a free and open source Web server powering over 50% of the
active Web sites on the Internet, with a developer base over 103 million [1].
Specifically, we study httpd2 at version 2.2.x.
MySQL: a popular open source relational database management system (RDBMS).
Building on these attributes, we gain confidence that the results of our empirical
investigation will be generalizable to other software of similar size and function.
The fact that many of these projects are widely used across the Internet add to
the significance and noteworthiness of our results. We can also compare our study
to that of similar empirical vulnerability and fault prediction studies by Shin [81],
Ayanam [16], and Gimothy et. al. [30].
4.2.2 Acquire Extraction and Modeling Tools
Several extraction tools exist for examining software repositories as well as analyzing
the code to automatically compute traditional metrics. Architectural recovery of
dependency graphs and calculation of various metrics is known as fact extraction.
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Related studies, as well as our own research have guided our selection of SciTools
Understand and Anaconda Python.
SciTools Understand is a commercial tool that provides architectural recovery of
call graph information and several complexity metrics [3]. In addition to being used
widely in the ESE literature, Understand provides Python APIs to access the fact
database it generates for a project [4, 5]. Listing 4.1 shows Python code to read




4 db = understand.open("test.udb")
5
6 #Generate an image fore each function showing its callers
7 #Each image named as ’callby_ <func >.png’
8 for func in db.ents("function ,method ,procedure"):




12 #Print print all files in the project for file in
db.ents("file"):
13 print(file.longname ())
Listing 4.1: Example Python interface to Understand
Anaconda Python is a collection of Python packages used by data scientists for so
called “data munging” or “data wrangling”, handling statistical computations needed
for sensitivity analysis, as well as machine learning algorithms. Using the interactive
75
IPython shell [72] from within JuPyter Notebook, we leverage several of Anaconda’s
bundled packages as follows:
Pandas is used to calculate traditional statistics such as mean, various percentiles,
and standard deviation.
SciPy is used for more advanced statistics calculation such determining coefficients
of correlation.
SciKitLearn is used for normalization and standardization preprocessing, as well
as to experiment with machine learning models for prediction.
Matplotlib is used for data visualization.
4.2.3 Develop Custom Tools and Mine Repositories
We leverage existing tools where possible to focus our analysis efforts on the re-
search itself, evaluating the discriminatory power of architectural metrics for vul-
nerability prediction, but as in many data mining activities, there is still much work
needed to extract, normalize, and pre-process data from various sources.
The following items represent large portions of Python software developed to
conduct this research:
• Repository Diff Extractor: Software to abstract the interface to version con-
trol systems for the purpose of extracting patches, diffs, or commits between
project version ranges. Although the interface may be extended to support ad-
ditional version control systems, we currently implement only Git. We use Git
because the source code of all our case study subjects make their development
history available using Git.
We utilize Git distributed version control system (DVCS) differencing tools (e.g.
git diff) in order to calculate coarse change metrics such as files changed
76
between versions, number of versions, etc. Additional custom software (diff-
parser) provides more precise change metrics, but at increased computation
time. By more precise, we mean relative to the information provided by git
diff. For each file changed in particular changeset, our diffparser provides
lines added, modified, and deleted. Git, on the other hand, provides only total
lines added and deleted and therefore does not provide information on when
an addition and subsequent deletion is actually a modification.
• Custom Fact Extractor (CFE): Scripts to calculate Sarkar et al’s modularity met-
rics [77] and Hassan’sHCM metrics [35]. The scripts in this tool category are of
central importance and required to calculate many of the metrics under study,
since there is no other publicly available tool support. Scripts within the CFE
interface with the fact database created by architectural recovery tools. Utili-
ties and scripts in this tool category are also be used to sum function and file
level relations at the module level. Note that we use the directory structure of
the project as a guide to modularity.
We more completely describe our custom tools and data mining activities in Sec-
tion 4.3.
4.2.4 Perform Modeling and Analysis of Subject Programs
For each subject program in Section 4.2.1, carry out prediction modeling and eval-
uation according to the details discussed in Chapter 3. Details for each case study
are enumerated in Chapter 5, where we also consolidate our empirical findings.
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4.3 Data Mining Activities
This section provides a more detailed examination of our data mining activities.
Aside from representing an important (and non-trivial) part of this work, we pro-
vide this discussion for two reasons. First, we wish to inform other ESE and MSR
researchers seeking additional information and insight into our methods. Secondly,
these activities are important because our analysis and results depend on the data
available for each software project studied.
Below, we refer to each software as a project to convey the notion that mining
activities transcend the resulting software product. That is, the project encompasses
multiple data sources used by the development team (and other actors) in the de-
velopment and use of the resulting software product. For example, the develop-
ment team tracks issues on the software product in an ITS (e.g., Bugzilla). Security
actors (both offensive and defensive) utilize information from public vulnerability
databases (e.g., NVD). The following steps highlight the mining activities carried out
for this research:
1. Mine NIST NVD [68] for security advisories applicable to the project
2. Analyze mined advisory data to determine versions of study (i.e., the version
range)
3. Mine the project VCS to extract facts related to each version
4. Determine affected files (i.e., our vulnerable files)
The following paragraphs provide additional detail as needed to understand the
case studies presented in Chapter 5. Specifically, we describe the criteria we use
to arrive at the studied version range as well as the different techniques employed
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to determine the set of files that were modified in order to fix a publicly disclosed
vulnerability.
Advisory data in this work consists primarily of CVE [58] entries extracted from
the NVD for each project. CVSS [57] scores related to specific advisories are extracted
from NVD records. We note here that other researchers engaged in similar empirical
studies [24] built advisory extraction tools specific to each subject studied. For ex-
ample, for Mozilla Firefox, both Shin [81], as well as Chowdhury and Zulkernine [24]
utilized parsing scripts specific to Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories (MFSA).
We employed similar parsing/scraping techniques for determining the set of files
patched to fix a given vulnerability. We provide additional detail on our approach
below.
For each project, we limit our study to a viable version range. We define viability
with respect to the following factors:
Frequency: Versions occurring more frequently in CVE summaries are are more
likely to offer data relevant to a vulnerability study.
Popularity: Popular versions of the project are likely to garner more widespread
interest from industry and the research community.
Recency: Recent versions often, but not always, coincide with popularity. Recency is
used as a tie-breaker in cases where frequency and popularity result in multiple
or overlapping version ranges.
As mentioned, we use different methods to determine the set of files modified to
fix a vulnerability. This set of files modified is used for marking our training data
with the vulnerable classification (Vuln+). For convenience, we refer to this set as
the vulnerable file set. A common pre-requisite for each method is Web scraping
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(and/or crawling) of the project’s release notes and security advisories. We devel-
oped spiders using the ScraPy Web crawling package. The method used to arrive at
the vulnerable file set depends on the information available in the release notes (or
security advisory Web-page) of each project and information available in the project’s
ITS and VCS. For example, both Firefox security advisories and MySQL release notes
include specific bug identifiers (IDs), but Apache HTTP Server does not. The inclu-
sion of specific bug IDs in Firefox and MySQL facilitate automated patch retrieval
(i.e., direct lookup by bug ID), while the absence of specific bug IDs in Apache HTTP
Server require additional manual effort to be used with semi-automated search tech-
niques. Additionally, Firefox’s ITS entries, directly referenced by the aforementioned
bug ID, contain patches associated with the fix. MySQL, in contrast, does not provide
patches associated with a fix for its specific bug ID. This leads to two primary meth-
ods for determining the vulnerable file set: download from ITS and extract from
VCS.
Download from ITS: This method is used when a bug ID is provided in the release
notes and patches are available from the project’s ITS. The ITS is indexed with
the bug id (and further scraped) to determine the vulnerable file set.
Extract from VCS: This method is used when patches are not accessible from the
project’s ITS and/or when a specific bug id is not provided in the release notes.
For projects where the vulnerable file set can be downloaded from the ITS, our
spiders obtain resolution and status terms, as well as perform automated text clas-
sification to determine which of the attached patches contain the vulnerable file set.
For example, a particular bug entry may contain several attached patches, some of
which may be a proof of concept or test code for the actual vulnerability fix. An
example snippet from one such Bugzilla entry is shown in Listing 4.2. The spider
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1 <tr id="a2" class =" bz_contenttype_text_plain bz_patch">
2 <td class =" bz_attach_desc" valign ="top">
3 <a href=" attachment.cgi?id =762008" title="View the content of
the attachment">
4 <b>Patch </b></a>
5 <span class=" bz_attach_extra_info">
6 (8.59 KB,patch)
7 <a href ="# attach_762008"
8 title ="Go to the comment associated with the
attachment">




13 <td class =" bz_attach_flags" valign ="top">
14 <span title=" Reviewer Fullname
(: reviewer_user)">reviewer_user </span >:
15 review+
16 <br>
17 <span title=" Approver Fullname




Listing 4.2: Example HTML from Bugzilla page parsed by Firefox spider
looks for keywords in the status fields associated with each attachment to determine
the patch with the vulnerability fix. Listing 4.3 shows Python source from the spider
that is used to search specific page element contents for the keywords review and
approval. Additional details are highlighted in the comments within the listings.
Additionally, although not filtered by the spider directly, resolution terms such as
FIXED, WONTFIX, and DUPLICATE are used when further filtering the scraped data.
Following Chowdhury [24], we are interested only in FIXED bugs that have a life cycle
status of VERIFIED or CLOSED.
For projects where the vulnerable file set cannot be determined from the ITS, we
use one of the following techniques to determine the vulnerable file set by searching
the VCS:
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1 # Locate the table
2 table = response.xpath(’// table[@id=" attachment_table "]’)
3
4 # Prerequisites for parsing attachments for affected files
5 # Ensure the bz_attach_flags column contains both review and
approval
6 # Ensure bz_attach_extra_info ’ is a patch (e.g., contains
"patch")
7
8 attach_xpath = ’./tr/td[@class =" bz_attach_flags" and\
9 contains (.,"review") and contains (.,"approval")]\
10 //preceding -sibling ::td[@class =" bz_attach_desc "]\
11 /span[@class =" bz_attach_extra_info" and
contains (.,"patch")]\
12
//preceding -sibling ::a[contains(@href ," attachment.cgi")]/@href’
13
14 links = table.xpath(attach_xpath).extract ()
Listing 4.3: Patch determination
• When a bug ID can be obtained, automatically search the VCS change logs (com-
mit history) for references to the bug (i.e., in the commit message), or
• When a bug id cannot be obtained, query associated CVE summary for keyword
stems that are subsequently used to search the VCS change logs in a semi-
automated fashion.
The semi-automated keyword approach was used primarily for the Apache HTTP
Server. Most of the CVE summaries for Apache HTTP highlight filenames or contain
keywords that can be used to search the VCS repository. For example, to search the
VCS for a change between two dates for path mod_status where the CVE summary
mentions XSS (cross-site scripting), one could use the following command:
$ git log --after="2006 -12 -31" --before="2008 -01 -01" \
--grep ’XSS ’ -- *mod_status*
Apache HTTP Server was the unique case study subject in this regard since we
used the above semi-automated keyword approach to manually determine the vul-
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nerable file set from information in the CVE alone. This was only possible due to
the detail included in the CVE entries for Apache HTTP Server. In the case of both
Firefox and MySQL, we were able to use the specific ITS entry identifiers (i.e., bug
identifiers) to use the aforementioned automated methods: Download from ITS, and
Extract from VCS.
4.4 Discussion Regarding Training Set Construction
Note that the construction of a suitable training set from the mined information
sources is non-trivial. Real world data sources contain information of varying ma-
turity, completeness, and accuracy. The variance and inconsistency in vulnerability
data presents multiple challenges to building a viable data set for training super-
vised machine learning algorithms. Figure 4.2 shows a Venn diagram to visualize
the required vulnerability information. For each software application, we require
information about individual, publicly disclosed, security vulnerabilities. Such infor-
mation includes the vulnerable file set, affected versions, and a severity score (from
CVE entry).
The mapping of the required vulnerability information is needed to build out the
TEDB tables and associations showing in Figure 4.3. The primary source for rows
in the Vulnerabilities table are CVE entries from the NIST NVD. Figure 4.4 shows an
example CVE entry. The Files table is populated for each Version of a Project based
on information in the VCS. The association between exactly what Version in a Project
contains a VulnerableFile is determined based on information from both CVE and
ITS entries, and is described at length in subsequent sections.
The previous sections discussed various challenges and approaches for obtaining
the vulnerable file set (VulnerableFile in Figure 4.3). However, such challenges first
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Figure 4.2: Required vulnerability information
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Figure 4.3: Training and evaluation database tables
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Figure 4.4: Example CVE entry with fix version and CVSS score highlighted
assume that vulnerability information is indeed publicly disclosed. Because our study
examines security vulnerabilities that are of a potentially sensitive nature, informa-
tion on the most recent and severe vulnerabilities are often not publicly accessible.
We encountered this situation for approximately 5%, or 138 ITS entries out of a total
of 2,747 ITS entries, that we scraped from the security advisory pages for Mozilla
Firefox (i.e., MFSA pages). Additional challenges include accurate association of a
particular vulnerability with a particular software revision, as well as consistently
determining a severity score.
Because we train our models to differentiate vulnerable from non-vulnerable files
and modules within each version of a software, it is necessary to accurately asso-
ciate a publicly disclosed vulnerability with the vulnerable file set in each version. As
shown by Figure 4.4, the summary text in the CVE entry typically contains mention
of versions prior to a given fix version that are affected by a vulnerability. CVE en-
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tries from NVD contain a list versions of the software that are affected by the specific
vulnerability disclosed in each CVE. However, in the case of the Apache HTTP Server,
we found that in more than one instance, the release notes (aka security report) for
version 2.2 [14] described a set of affected versions that were not otherwise found in
the corresponding CVE entry. For example, CVE-2010-1623 is specifically mentioned
by the security advisory pages for Apache HTTP Server version 2.2, but CVE-2010-
1623 itself does not list any affected version after 1.3.9. In the case of Apache HTTP
Server, we chose to use the affected version information from the Apache-specific
security advisory pages for version 2.2. In the cases of Mozilla Firefox and MySQL,
the security advisories and release notes only listed the fix version, as opposed to
a detailed list enumerating each individual version. Given the absence of a detailed
list of affected versions from the security advisories and release notes for Firefox
and MySQL, we turned to the CVE data for additional insight. We performed a study
of the affected versions listed in CVE entries corresponding to Firefox and MySQL
and found that in our version ranges of interest (i.e., the inspection interval I) for
each application, all versions prior to the listed fix version were affected. When
building our training data for MySQL and Firefox, we therefore assumed that a vul-
nerable file was also vulnerable in previous versions, of course requiring that the file
actually existed in the earlier version. We will refer to this key assumption as the
Previously Vulnerable Assumption. Below, we describe additional detail around our
investigation of the affected versions listed in CVE data to validate this assumption.
In the course of undertaking the aforementioned investigation related to affected
versions listed in the CVE data from the NIST NVD, we also noticed a change in the
completeness of the affected version list in said CVE entries. For example, Firefox
CVE entries corresponding to version 36 and earlier (from years 2011 to 2015) often
enumerate all affected versions, listing each one with its own <vuln:product> tag.
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However, CVE entries after and including CVE-2015-2706 (for years 2015 and 2016)
only list one affected version, (not counting so called ESR, or extended service release
versions). An example of the affected version list is shown for CVE-2016-1935 in its
raw form in Listing 4.4. Since we only look at the CPE entries denoted as an applica-
tion (i.e., cpe:/a:) and exclude ESR entries, the extraction processing for this entry
results in only Firefox version 43.0.4. Although the <vuln:vulnerable-software-list>
(i.e., affected software list) contains only 43.0.4, the summary text for CVE-2016-1935
indicates that prior versions are also affected. We found this was also the case for
all other entries (over our inspection interval I).
As mentioned previously, our additional validation effort led us to the Previously
Vulnerable Assumption, and a new view of training set construction which is dis-
cussed at length in later sections.
Previously Vulnerable Assumption: In the absence of trustworthy data related to
specific versions of a software that are impacted by a vulnerability fixed in ver-
sion N, we assume that all prior versions, over the inspection interval I , up to
and including version N − 1 are also impacted.
Impacted versions are thus expressed as Vi, where:
• Vi denotes a vulnerable version number i = {i1, i2, . . . ,N − 1}
• I denotes the inspection interval, I = {RMin, . . . , RMax},
• RMin andRMax correspond to the minimum and maximum release versions
studied respectively.
• Note that i ∈ I , therefore ∀i, i ≥ RMin and i < N ≤ RMax
Note that the Previously Vulnerable Assumption is contingent on validation over
interval I . Using Firefox as an example, interval I corresponds to the inclusive range
6. .49.
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1 <entry id="CVE -2016 -1935" >
2 <!- ** NOTE: other blocks omitted for brevity ** ->
3 <vuln:vulnerable -software -list >
4
<vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.1.0 </ vuln:product >
5
<vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.2.0 </ vuln:product >
6 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:novell:leap :42.1 </ vuln:product >
7 <vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox:43.0.4</vuln:product >
8 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:oracle:linux :5.0 </ vuln:product >
9 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:novell:opensuse :13.1 </ vuln:product >
10 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:novell:opensuse :13.2 </ vuln:product >
11
<vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.5.0 </ vuln:product >
12 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:oracle:linux :6.0 </ vuln:product >
13 <vuln:product >cpe:/o:oracle:linux :7.0 </ vuln:product >
14 <vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.0 </ vuln:product >
15
<vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.3.0 </ vuln:product >
16
<vuln:product >cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox_esr :38.4.0 </ vuln:product >
17 </vuln:vulnerable -software -list >
18 <vuln:summary >Buffer overflow in the BufferSubData function in
19 Mozilla Firefox before 44.0 and Firefox ESR 38.x before 38.6




23 <vuln:cve -id >CVE -2016 -1935 </ vuln:cve -id >
24 </entry >
Listing 4.4: CVE version snippet for CVE-2016-1935
89
Our additional goal of relating the severity of vulnerabilities to various features of
our training data requires the use of a standardized measure of severity. At the out-
set of this work, we decided to use the CVSS score for each vulnerability (i.e., a CVE
entry in the NIST NVD) as an indicator of the severity. Two different cross-reference
consistency complications related to the use of the CVSS score from the CVE pre-
sented itself in practice: unknown CVE identifiers and missing CVE identifiers. We
describe each in additional detail below.
Unknown CVE Identifiers result from inconsistent mapping among security ad-
visories, release notes, and ITS entries. This mapping inconsistency presents an
issue when attempting to cross-reference a CVE identifier from a mined ITS entry.
For example, the security advisory pages and ITS entry for one vulnerability in Fire-
fox mapped to CVE-2011-1187, which is actually cataloged in the NIST NVD under
Chrome. Because this entry shows up under a different browser software, this par-
ticular CVE was not found in our local database built by filtering the Firefox CVE
data from the NIST NVD.
Missing CVE Identifiers occur when a security vulnerability is noted on a security
advisory page (or in release notes), but does not list an associated CVE. That is, the
advisory page may list only the ITS entry, but fail to list any associated CVE identifier.
While one might try to determine a comparable score from the ITS entry, we found
that some entries were inaccessible (read sensitive). In addition, our experience
with scraping the data informed us that, in several instances, a single CVE may
be associated with multiple ITS entries, and in turn, various combinations of files.
These relationships among the data sources mined for information are depicted by
the diagram in Figure 4.5. Rather than fabricate an overall score, we decide to omit
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such entries from correlation analysis.
Figure 4.5: Relationship between vulnerability entities
The above complications limit our ability to reliably use CVSS scores in all cases.
Because we are able to resolve the ITS entry to the individual affected files, we can




1 2 3 4 5
Time
1 foo.c not in Vuln FixedIn,0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0
5 2 2 1 1 FixedIn,0
6 2 2 1 1 0
7 2 2 1 1 0
Table 4.2: Marking technique for vulnerable files
4.5 Vulnerable File Marking Approach
The combination of the Previously Vulnerable Assumption and the notion of CVE
identifiers attributing a scored severity, leads to a vulnerable entity marking tech-
nique. We present a view of this marking pattern in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 depicts a marking for a single vulnerable file in the TEDB. The mark-
ing shown above is for an associated CVE. File-to-CVE relationships are stored in
the TEDB outside this table. The table is interpreted as follows, for some single
file foo.c, in iterating through mined vulnerability fix data for over the inspection
interval I .
1. At version 1, foo.c is not in the vulnerability table; no record or marking; same
at version 2
2. At version 3, the table building logic observes mined data indicating a security
fix for version 3
• The table building logic adds entries for foo.c in versions 1 and 2
• The table building logic increments CveCount to 1 in records correspond-
ing to versions 1 and 2, and adds any corresponding CVE relationship the
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File-to-CVE table
3. At version 4, no mined security fix information is available for foo.c
4. At version 5, the steps at version 3 are repeated for the new fix information by
applying the Previous Vulnerability Assumption
• Table building logic back-propagates the relationship for any newly asso-
ciated CVE fixed in 5
• The CveCount for prior entries of foo.c are incremented, resulting in the
pattern depicted in Table 4.2
Note that the FixVersion is not included in the marking depicted by Table 4.2.
Inclusion of the fix version artificially inflates a rank order assessment by causing
metrics assessed with Spearman correlation to artificially “lock on” to these “se-
curity fix oracles”. Our approach seeks to better understand factors occurring in
development of a software product that leads to severe vulnerabilities, as opposed
to measuring the development effort applied to the development of the security
fixes themselves. Direct measurement of the development activity related to the se-
curity issue fixes is less relevant for better understanding the origins surrounding
the original introduction of the vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of developer focus, poor
understanding of requirements, time to market pressure leading to shortcuts).
4.5.1 Vulnerability Distributions and Related Signals
One must ensure that the vulnerability table reflects an accurate vulnerability dis-
tribution at any point in time and not the fix distribution (e.g., over time when char-
acterized as successive version slices). This is a phenomenon we experienced in our
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model building process where a sanity check of correlation values revealed an echo of
the fix distribution, rather than accurately characterizing desired relationships with
the vulnerability distribution, i.e., within a vulnerability slice. As we discovered, this
issue is especially acute for repository mined change metrics counting number of
files changed or LOC, as they will directly measure the development activity coincid-
ing with the creation of security fixes for known vulnerabilities, thereby artificially
inflating correlation results when evaluating change based metrics for vulnerability
prediction. Thinking of change based metrics across version slices leads to inter-
pretation of the overall patterns as vulnerability and fix signals respectively. We can
think of this phenomenon as failure to remove the “security fix signal”, which forms
a vulnerability oracle and has the effect akin to including a label as a feature during
training. In other words, including labeled observations (or oracle entries) as fea-
tures when feeding data to a learning model. A model trained on oracle data for its
test set would show 100% precision, but would be completely useless in accurately
predicting vulnerabilities in practical real world scenarios.
Assuming a typical scenario where a security fix for version N + 1 is developed
in the prior version N, correlation evaluation of size based repository mined change
metrics will show inflated results. Because change metrics measure the intervalN−1
to N, an observer at version N, making predictions for version N + 1 from mined
data, will have a vulnerability oracle for the fix included with the associated change
based metric (measured over the interval N − 1 to N). A review of the literature
(see Section 2.3.1) will find hints of analogous phenomenon during discussion of
partial correlation correction for LOC compensation, although we have not seen the
rationale for needed compensation so clearly explained as removal of the security fix
signal. This also means that data from research on change based metrics are likely
inflated if the researcher failed to specifically mention accounting for the impact of
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this effect by removing the counts of known security fix data from the repository
mined change metric.
Aside from exercising caution to avoid the above pitfalls when building our train-
ing tables, we force additional delay into change based metrics by phase shifting the
change based signal to prior versions N−2 or N−3. The rationale for this particular
phase shift compensation technique for change based metrics is to remove the effect
of the fix oracle from the current observation intervalN−1 toN. In effect, relegating
the impact of the oracle to previous version slices in this manner “melts” the oracle
effect into the known vulnerability distribution, which is more consistent with our
approach to feature evaluation for vulnerability prediction, and helps to remove a
bias that otherwise blinds us from picking up on more useful “signal”.
4.6 Module and API Identification
Throughout this work, we make extensive use of the term module. In earlier sec-
tions, we noted that we had decided upon directory structure as a way of practically
carrying out our mining activities. We provide additional detail here, in order to
inform discussion in Section 4.7, covering our change burst detection methods, as
well Chapters 5 and 6, where we discuss experimental findings and conclusions.
Our method for module identification is based on identifying patterns in the di-
rectory path, relative to the project’s root repository. Path names that are less than
two parts deep use the corresponding directory structure path as the module iden-
tification string. Path names longer than two parts deep use a heuristic to provide
the most relevant module identifier by using the directory structure. We note that
“most relevant” is subjective, based on our experience as software professionals,
and on our observations of common approaches to code organization across soft-
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ware projects. The module identification logic first looks for the keyword ‘lib’ in the
path components, and then applies further heuristics, such as searching for com-
mon names (i.e., ‘src’, ‘test’, ‘include’) to consolidate the subtrees under the lowest
applicable level. As a clarifying example, we simply show a few the test cases in
Listing 4.5 that exercises our technique for module identification.
1 test_data = [
2 {’INPUT ’:
"security/nss/external_tests/google_test/gtest/src",
3 ’EXPECTED ’: "security/nss"
4 },
5 {’INPUT ’: "storage/test",
6 ’EXPECTED ’: "storage"
7 },
8 {’INPUT ’: "security/nss/lib/pki",
9 ’EXPECTED ’: "security/nss/lib/pki"
10 },
11 {’INPUT ’: "nsprpub/lib/libc/src",
12 ’EXPECTED ’: "nsprpub/lib/libc"
13 },
14 {’INPUT ’: "toolkit/components/build",
15 ’EXPECTED ’: "toolkit/components"
16 }
Listing 4.5: Python test snippet for module identification
Recall the module metrics MII and APIU are relative to a module and characterize
interaction with other modules. In both metrics, there is a concept of identifying
a public API for the module. We note that for a large projects, containing millions
of lines of code, it is necessary to devise an approximation for what constitutes the
public API, since it is unfeasible to search through the entire codebase. Our method
relies in part on information from the Understand tool, as well as heuristics of our
own design.
As we process functions (or methods) in the codebase using the understand tool,
we identify front line functions [25] from the standard C library, according to the
list given by Manadhata [51]. We consider such front line functions part of a STDLIB
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meta-module. All front line functions thus identified are considered part of the
STDLIB public API. Automated identification of the functions in the public API of
other modules (that is, modules that are not the STDLIB meta-module) are based
on the filename, its extension, or information reported by the Understand tool. We
briefly expand on these steps in the following paragraphs.
After determining a function’s possible inclusion in the STDLIB meta-module,
we subsequently examine the filename reported to contain the function, and take
different branches of additional processing, depending on whether the file is a header
file (i.e., .h), or a source file (i.e., .c).
Functions (methods) in header files are classified as API functions if the header
declaring them meets any of the following:
• ends with .IDL, as such define interfaces (i.e., API) calls
• contains the string ‘PUBLIC’ anywhere in the name, ‘PUB/’ in a path stem,
or ‘PUB.’ preceding the file extension
• contains the string ‘API/’ in a path stem, or ‘API.’ preceding the file exten-
sion
Functions (methods) in source files: are classified as API functions if the name of
the function starts with the name of its file stem. An example is would be
sqlite3_exec(), found in sqlite3.c. The function name sqlite3_exec()
starts with stem sqlite3
Finally, we look at the information reported by the Understand tool, related to the
function declaration. If the declaration is either ’VIRTUAL FUNCTION’, or ’STATIC
MEMBER FUNCTION’, we classify the function as an API function because, in our
experience, the majority of such functions define a class interface. Virtual functions
often form the base of inheritance, in order to provide a uniform interface that can
be subclassed. Likewise, static member functions are often used as builder or factory
objects, as interfaces to allocate resources or return handles to dynamically created
objects.
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Similar techniques are used prior to public determination, based on the above
heuristics, based on whether the string ’PRIVATE’ and its variants appear in the
filename, as well as similar techniques given to the ’STATIC’ and ’PRIVATE’ keywords,
depending on a variety of nuances best examined directly from the source code for
our mining software.
As noted above, calculation of the module metrics require that functions be clas-
sified as API functions.We elaborate the preceding detail regarding our techniques,
since as stated, they directly impact calculation of module the metrics. Because
our mining and training software performs no additional compilation (and we per-
form no additional preprocessor definition for the Understand tool, inbound calls
are overestimated for conditionally compiled code. In such cases, Understand can-
not tell what code would actually be compiled into the resulting build. This was a
compromise made in order to study several sequential versions of large open source
projects such as Firefox; again, it simply is not feasible to define all these by hand for
each version of our large study subjects. However, because inbound calls are overes-
timated, and API calls are likely underestimated, the overall approach is conservative
in terms of keeping with our theme of severity. As we will see, this is reflected by
our empirical data that show good discrimination performance based on the count
of public API functions (n_api). That is, N_API is a simple characterization of the
interconnected of a module.
4.7 Change Burst Detection
Change bursts and their related metrics are discussed in detail in Sections 2.1.3 and
3.10. This section provides additional detail around the mining and extraction of
change burst metrics. We provide additional insight on our change burst detection
98
Figure 4.6: Burst detection state machine
approach and detail caveats and assumptions made when calculating change burst
metrics.
Recall that a change burst, CB(G,B) is parameterized with with gap size G and
burst size B. The gap size, G, is the maximum distance between successive changes,
such that those changes are considered within the same burst. The burst size is
the minimum number of successive changes required to be considered a burst. Fig-
ure 4.6 shows the state machine logic used to detect these burst sequences with
parameters G and B.
Adjusting the the gap size and burst size enables additional filtering on the re-
lated metrics. Increases in burst size decreases across the maximum absolute values
for related metrics as the shorter burst sequences are eliminated from consideration.
Increases in gap size result in longer burst sequences that in turn yield increasingly
larger maximum absolute values. These relationships are shown in Figure 4.7 rela-
tive to the number of files changed within a burst.
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Figure 4.7: Change burst parameter effect on files changed metric
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Nagappan et. al. [65] note that a controlled change process is required in order
for bursts to provide a meaningful signal against the noise of regular development
activity. This implies that changes go through some type of review before committed
to the central repository. A common practice in industry is to first review the change
with an online review tool before finally “submitting”, or uploading it into the central
VCS.
Our mining software uses the git “commit date" associated with each changeset
in order to perform comparisons against a gap size, G, which is specified in days. A
phenomenon complicating the construction of the training database is the fact that
dates associated with changesets in a VCS do not necessarily follow the sequence in
which those changesets are merged into the VCS. This often occurs when as different
branches are merged together, or may also result when a changeset is under review
for a long period. Additionally, at least under git, it is also possible to manipulate the
commit date. We encountered this phenomenon, which we refer to as “a reversal”,
for both Firefox and MySQL repositories. A reversal occurs when the date associated
with a subsequent change Changei+1, precedes the current change Changei. That
is, we expect the mapping between change sequence and its corresponding date
sequence to maintain relative ordering,Date(Changei)  Date(Changei+1), i ∈ I .
However, a reversal is the violation of this expected ordering.
In the case of Firefox, we attempted to use supplementary information available
to correct the date. Specifically, our mining software searches through the comments
in the associated ITS entry, in order to determine when staged changes were pushed
to the Mozilla Central development trunk. Briefly, our method is outlined as follows:
1. Parse the ITS entry (bug_id) from the git commit message
2. Fetch the ITS entry by bug_id
101
3. Search comments for the Mozilla Central URL
RE_HG_MOZ_URL = re.compile( re.escape (\
"https ://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla -central/rev/") + "(\w+)" )
4. Search for the push date needed for the correction
RE_PUSH_DATEMATCH = re.compile (\
".*\s+at\s+(\d{4}\-\d{2}\-\d{2}\s+\
\d{2}\:\d{2}\s+[\ -|\+]\d{4})")
Because it is not possible to determine a correction in all cases, we also log this
phenomenon as two new burst measurements we call CountReversals and MaxSe-
qByDate. In cases where the mining software encounters no date reversals in the
VCS between versions N −1 and N, then MaxSeqByDate is equivalent to the number
of commits (i.e., CountTouches) over the interval defined by N − 1 to N. In cases
where a reversal occurs, MaxSeqByDate represents the largest contiguous sequence
before encountering a date reversal.
4.8 Approach Summary
This chapter provided a review of key aspects of our approach. We reviewed the
overall mining and model building approach and then highlighted specific details
relevant to both the experimental results and other researchers. In particular, we
reviewed our rational for deciding on specific version ranges of our study subjects,
reviewed challenges faced, and discussed our workarounds for the same. Overall, the
key points to take away from this section are experiences regarding burst collection,
and our definition of the Previous Vulnerability Assumption.
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With our approach to change burst collection, we look at each individual commit
or VCS change-set for the purposes of gathering the sequential changes on a module,
which we define as a directory. Because of challenges associated with a VCS, and
the manner in which code is committed to a central repository, we have additionally
introduced the concept of a reversal. A reversal occurs when the date associated with
a subsequent change precedes the current change. We add additional measurements
CountReversals and MaxSeqByDate to quantify the reversal phenomenon.
The Previous Vulnerability Assumption aids us in setting up our training data
for evaluating correlation between individual metrics and the severity of security
vulnerabilities. In the face of uncertainty as to which versions of a file a CVE might
apply, we assume all previous versions are vulnerable (assuming of course that asso-
ciated files exist in said previous version). Since the assumption applies retroactively
(i.e., looks backward in time, applying to previous versions), we believe it is a better
approximation of the true population of vulnerable files at that historical point in
time.
Although this historical viewpoint may be of limited utility for carrying out pre-
dictions at present, we posit that it offers a superior test and evaluation environment
for building and evaluating the performance of vulnerability prediction models; if
for no other reason than there is more information available on which to train and
evaluate prediction performance. Moreover, we don’t make these statements with-




Experimental Results, and Analysis of
Metrics and Vulnerability Predictions
In this chapter, we enumerate the experimental results for our software case stud-
ies. Results within each section are prefaced by an overview of the the project and
important characteristics, such as versions studied, project size, and the approxima-
tion of the project’s true vulnerability density given by our historical training tables
(i.e., that define the vulnerable training set). A detailed discussion of observations
that affect prediction model building are discussed according to the top performing
metrics, evaluated by Welch’s two-tailed test and Spearman rank correlation.
As we lead into the subsequent sections, we note the impact on the view of the
vulnerability tables built for a project, by version “slices”, moving forward in time
across said slices. As the data presented in this section will show, we find new
insights with this view of training as we observe higher average precision in early
version slices and subsequently observe it “roll off” as we advance our example
learning framework through those slices.
Note that both Welch’s two-tailed test and the Spearman correlation do not make
any assumptions about the distribution of the true populations from which our ex-
perimental samples are evaluated. That is, both Welch’s test and the Spearman cor-
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relation are non-parametric. Non-parametric evaluation techniques are especially
relevant for vulnerability model building because:
1. The true (i.e., real) distribution of residual vulnerabilities is unknown
2. Vulnerable entities are the minority class
Regarding the second item, vulnerabilities are far fewer in number, if not or-
ders of magnitude so, when compared to standard issue defects. We also note that
the t-test is used to evaluate class discrimination, while Spearman is used to evalu-
ate relative ranks of values. As also noted by Shin [81], we note here that because
Spearman is a rank order correlation, it does not make any quantification related to
linear relationships or magnitudes of the same. We feel this last point is important
to stress in order to distinguish from the more commonly used Pearson correlation,
which does assess linear relationship and magnitude.
5.1 Test Harness and Evaluation Approach
For each case study, we use the same experimental framework for evaluation. Our
framework for evaluation consists of a training and test harness built with Scikit-
learn [71] that provides a ten-fold stratified random split of the data, withholding 33%
of the data for test evaluation. The framework is applied on select metrics, iterating
the ten-fold stratified split for 10 iterations (e.g. 10 x 10-fold cross-validation), as is
a widely accepted practice in vulnerability model evaluation.
We note here salient elements of our overall evaluation, adopted as a conven-
tion in our reporting. Because we are searching for residual vulnerabilities, their
true population distribution is unknown by definition. Therefore we are always as-
suming that any statement about the vulnerability population is an approximation.
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Moreover, from the samples we have (i.e., the files we’ve already labeled as vulnera-
ble and neutral) it is evident that the distributions are heavily skewed, with neutral
files outnumbering vulnerable files by a factor of roughly ten to one. Hence, we use
the random stratified sampling technique to preserve the skewed distribution in our
datasets, while training across the ten folds prevents our model from over-fitting on
neutral files (i.e., the majority class).
5.2 Training Labels and Metrics Definitions
This section provides a roadmap for the case studies presented in this chapter. We
describe the training scores and labels associated with vulnerable files and review
the definitions for the metrics analyzed.
Vulnerable and neutral entities (i.e., files and modules) are distinguished based
on a binomial column label Vuln. We set Vuln 1̄ for vulnerable entities that we
mined from security advisories and release notes as described in Section 4.3. Neutral
entities, or entities where no vulnerability has yet been found are labeled with Vuln
= 0. We remind the reader with the caveat that although neutral entities are not yet
known to be vulnerable, a label of Vuln = 0 is not an unequivocal assertion that the
entity is not yet vulnerable in reality. Rather, Vuln = 0 means we don’t know the
entity is vulnerable.
5.2.1 Counting Vulnerabilities and Quantifying Severity
In addition to the binomial Vuln label, we can also count how many security related
issues that the file was associated with from the ITS, VCS, or determined vulnera-
ble using some other reference source. Other reference sources in our context are




The binomial label indicating whether or not the entity is vul-
nerable or neutral. For modules, this is set to 1 if the module
contains at least one vulnerable file.
RawCount
The ordinal count of security issues (most commonly counted
as ITS entries) associated with a file in version N + 1. For mod-
ules, this is the sum of the RawCount across all files within the
module.
CveCount
The ordinal count of CVE entries associated with a file in version
N. For modules, this is the sum of the CveCount for all files in
the module.
AvgScore
TotalScore ÷ CveCount. Simply, the average score; refer to To-
talScore and CveCount defined in other rows. AvgScore is equal
to the CVSS Base score metric in cases where CveCount is 1, and
is 0 when CveCount is 0.
MaxScore
The maximum CVSS score, from among associated CVEs (float-
ing point). For modules, this is the maximum across all files
contained in the module.
TotalScore
The sum of CVSS scores from associated CVEs (floating point).
For modules, this is the sum of the TotalScore across all files
contained in the module.
Table 5.1: Definitions for classification labels and expected scores
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determined is stored as RawCount. The RawCount for an entity in version N, is the
number of security related issues fixed in the next version, N + 1, and represents
the likelihood that the entity is vulnerability prone.
The CveCount is an ordinal value indicating the number of unique CVE entries
with which an entity is associated, irrespective of version. For example, if a file
(foo.c) is associated with three different CVE entries in version N, then CveCount = 3.
Note that RawCount indicates the number of security issues with which the entity
was associated, without requiring the entity to be resolved (cross-referenced) to a
CVE. By resolved, we typically mean that the ITS entry (e.g., Bugzilla id 1226423)
referenced a corresponding CVE identifier (e.g., CVE-2015-7223), and that said CVE
identifier was also in the official list we mined from NIST NVD as described in Section
4.3. For those entities which we were able to cross-reference to a CVE entry, we
define additional CVE-based counts and scores. These additional CVE-based scores
are defined in Table 5.1, along with Vuln and RawCount.
We undertake to stress to the reader that “vulnerability”, and even “vulnerabil-
ity count” are nebulous terms. In this work, assume that “vulnerability count”, or
VulnCount as we call it in many of our figures, is the same as the CveCount. We
elaborate on these nuances and relationships here to clarify that it is important to
be specific about one’s definition of “vulnerability” and “count of vulnerabilities”.
The use of a vulnerability count measure without specific definition is inherently
ambiguous and has the potential to lead to inconsistent results and confusion.
RawCount and CveCount may differ for a vulnerable entity, especially when that
entity is involved in more than one vulnerability. We will use a file to explain the
point, but a module would also be similarly affected. Using a file as our example,
we assume that a vulnerable file must be associated with at least one ITS entry (i.e.,
RawCount = 1), to know that it is vulnerable. Following from the relationships dis-
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cussed in Section 4.3, and illustrated in Figure 4.5, the following relationships are
possible for our example file:
RawCount == CveCount when a single unique ITS entry maps to a single unique
CVE identifier.
RawCount < CveCount when a single unique ITS entry maps to multiple unique
CVE identifiers.
RawCount > CveCount when multiple unique ITS entries map to either
• a single unique CVE identifier, or
• no CVE identifiers
As stated above, the preceding relationships are presented, for example pur-
poses, assuming the entity (e.g., a file) is associated with an ITS entry (as was the case
for Firefox). However, as discussed in Section 4.3, vulnerable entities are not always
classified as vulnerable through association with an ITS entry. Recall that a vulnera-
ble classification may also be derived from the VCS, by mention of a CVE identifier (as
was the method used for MySQL Database), or named directly in a CVE entry (as was
the method used for Apache HTTP Web server). For our purposes, RawCount helps
to identify vulnerable entities we learned about through our mining activities, but
were not resolved to a particular CVE entry. Entities with a RawCount > CveCount,
and where CveCount = 0, represent entities that we have learned are vulnerable, but
for which severity cannot also be ascribed.
Throughout this work, we use CveCount interchangeably with “vulnerability count”.
By standardizing on CveCount, we build on the already well-formed definition for
CVE entries (and their use in industry) as synonymous with identified security vulner-
abilities in software. Finally, our decision to standardize on CveCount additionally
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facilitates our use of CVSS scores that are exclusively associated with CVE entries as
severity quantification metrics. Note that when CveCount = 1, the average, max, and
total are all equal. Table 5.1 summarizes the quantification metrics.
As stated, the CVSS-derived scores enable us to quantify severity. We note here
that although RawCount and CveCount can be used as estimators for vulnerability
proneness, they may fail to accurately characterize (i.e., estimate) severity. Although
it is true that RawCount can tell us whether or not a file is a likely “repeat offender”
(that is, a party to more than one reported security fix), there is no additional quan-
tification of severity. For purposes of discussion, we will refer to such current ap-
proaches as “RawCount estimators”.
The failure of RawCount based estimators to better characterize severity is a
shortcoming of contemporary approaches because they do not correspond well with
the real problem. Contemporary model building approaches built only on RawCount
estimators fail to account for the properties of one-off severe bugs in the cyber se-
curity domain. That is, a software entity may only be involved in one security fix
during its existence (i.e. RawCount = 1), but it is entirely plausible that the vul-
nerability corresponding to said fix, when exploited by a bad actor, results in full
information security compromise. That is, the affected victim suffers a complete
loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability to their information and com-
putation resources. Because current approaches emphasize estimation of the fix
probability alone, they may miss the more important identification of vulnerable
files with severe impact. Moreover, this phenomenon is in fact exacerbated since,
as our data show, and as past case studies in the related literature repeatedly show,
repeat offenders are in the minority of vulnerable entities.
Because empirical evidence suggests that repeat offenders are in the minority
of vulnerable entities, coupled with the fact that current approaches (to building
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vulnerability prediction models) emphasize estimators against RawCount, it follows
that current approaches also likely fail to accurately reflect the true vulnerability
distribution of a software project. Counting security fixes, and not otherwise em-
phasizing severity density and severity, strongly suggest that current approaches
to model building fail to capture the reality that a single vulnerability, in some cen-
tral module or file, can have a severe security impact. Hence, we not only examine
the discriminative power of our selected metrics (for predicting neutral vs vulner-
able class membership), but we also evaluate their rank order correlation against
our severity quantification scores: AvgScore, MaxScore, and TotalScore. Our CVSS-
derived scores are shown in Table 5.1. For all the reasons outlined in preceding
paragraphs, we believe metrics specifically selected for their relevance to the resid-
ual vulnerability problem, and that also estimate our CVSS-derived scores, provide
better correspondence with the true vulnerability distribution, and imbue models
built from them with an additional severity estimation component.
5.2.2 Complexity Metrics
All file level complexity metrics are extracted relative to the git commit revision
corresponding to our collected version N. As such, all metrics thus mined form a
set of observations at N for predicting N + 1.
We used SciTools Understand tool to extract file level complexity metrics. The
understand tool exports several metrics, detailed descriptions of which can be found
at [3]. We list the top few metrics that were repeatedly selected by the ANOVA [59]
filter in our classification experiments (i.e., primarily using the logit classifier), in
addition to a few metrics that are widely recognized across defect and vulnerability
literature. Refer to Figure 5.1 for a visualization of the the relative frequency among
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the top six metrics automatically selected based on the classif ANOVA prefilter we
used in Scikitlearn based learner pipeline when set to select K best features based on
F-score (or F statistic). Note that we also experimented with K at additional values
K < 5.
The visual in Figure 5.1 shows consistent selection of the same metrics, despite
using stratified random selection and iterating across all versions of Firefox over
our inspection interval. An observant reader may question why we show six bars,
when the feature selection limit, K is set to 5. Although the the top five features
were selected (i.e., K = 5), the chart displays six bars. This is not an error; whatever
random combination of vulnerable and neutral files selected in each fold determine
the corresponding variance and the subsequent selection corresponding metrics as a
coefficient in determining fit. Our test harness simply increments a frequency count
corresponding to the feature selected at each individual iteration. The interesting
result is not that there are six features, but the remarkable consistency required
to select the same subset of these few features over so many randomly perturbed
iterations.
5.2.3 File Level Churn Metrics
A review of file level churn metric definitions is provided in Table 5.3 to facilitate
quick reference in the following sections. Note that all churn metrics begin collection
by walking the reverse topographically sorted revision history provided by the git
log command from the revision corresponding to the interval N − 1 to N. The
observation point for prediction is still at version N. As such, all metrics thus mined


























































CountDeclFunction Number of functions.
CountLineCode Number of lines containing source code. [LOC]
CountLineCodeDecl
Number of lines containing declarative source
code.
CountLinePreprocessor Number of preprocessor lines.
CountStmt Number of statements.
CountStmtDecl Number of declarative statements.
CountStmtExe Number of executable statements.
MaxCyclomaticModified
Maximum modified cyclomatic complexity of
nested functions or methods.
MaxCyclomaticStrict
Maximum strict cyclomatic complexity of
nested functions or methods.
MaxNesting Maximum nesting level of control constructs.
RatioCommentToCode Ratio of comment lines to code lines.
SumCyclomatic
Sum of cyclomatic complexity of all nested
functions or methods. [aka WMC]
SumEssential
Sum of essential complexity of all nested func-
tions or methods.
Table 5.2: Definitions for file complexity metrics at version N
Metric Definition
CountTouches
The number of changsets (e.g., VCS commits)
touching the file since N − 1 [aka. Num-
Changes]
CountTouchesP1 CountTouches for this file from N − 2
CountTouchesP2 CountTouches for this file from N − 3
HCPF
The historical complexity period factor, an en-
tropy based metric indicating the file’s degree
of contribution to entropy over the interval
N − 1 to N
LinesAdded The number of lines added since N − 1
LinesModified The number of lines modified since N − 1
LinesDeleted The number of lines deleted since N − 1
TotalTouches
The cumulative sum of CountTouches at N,
from all prior intervals




The number of changsets (e.g., VCS commits)
touching the module path since N − 1 [aka.
NumberOfConsecutiveChanges] 3.10].
CountReversals
The number of commit date reversals encoun-
tered when scanning the (e.g., VCS commits)
changes within the module since N − 1.
MaxSeqByDate
Largest sequence of consecutive changes by
date when CountReversals > 0, otherwise this
metric is equivalent to CountTouches.
CountBursts
The total count of bursts in the module since
N − 1 [aka. NumberOfChangeBursts].
CountFilesChanged
The total count of files changed in the module
since N − 1.
NetAddedInBurst
A churn metric characterizing the net positive
number of lines added since N − 1. This is
LinesAdded - LinesDeleted, when LinesDeleted
≤ LinesAdded, otherwise 0. This quantity is
LinesAdded when LinesDeleted = 0.
TotalChurnInBurst
The number of lines modified, as the sum of
lines added and lines deleted since N − 1 (as
reported by git diff).
Table 5.4: Definitions for module change burst metrics observed at version N
5.2.4 Module Level Burst and Architectural Metrics
Module level burst metrics are defined in Table 5.4 to facilitate quick reference in
the following sections. Note that all churn metrics begin collection by walking the
reverse topographically sorted revision history provided by the git log command
from the revision corresponding to the interval N − 1 to N. The observation point
for prediction is still at version N. As such, all metrics thus mined form a set of
observations at N for predicting N + 1.
In the course of our study we added additional metrics not found in the original
literature 3.10. In particular, we have added CountReversals and CountFilesChanged




The API function usage index defined in Sec-
tion 3.8; appears in graphs in lowercase as
apiu.
k_ext_fa
Number of calls from external modules to the
public API exposed by a given module; Refer
to Section 3.8
k_ext_m
Number of external calls from external mod-
ules; Refer to Section 3.8.
MII
Module Interaction Index defined in Section
3.8; appears in generated graphs in lowercase
mii.
N_API
The number of public API functions or meth-
ods exported by a module, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.6
Table 5.5: Definitions for module metrics observed at version N
Version LOC CountFunctions CountMethods CountFiles
6 2,584,376 145,384 82,529 11,329
28 4,473,921 263,480 105,902 20,050
49 5,818,230 355,352 116,753 25,592
Table 5.6: Firefox project statistics
Table 5.5 provides an overview of our module metric definitions.
5.3 Case Study 1: Mozilla Firefox Web Browser
We studied Mozilla Firefox versions 6 to 49, representing a time span of approxi-
mately five years from August, 2011 to August, 2016. Table 5.6 provides an overview
of size measurements across the first, middle, and last versions studied. The mea-
surements shown here were collected from the SciTools Understand tool [3]. The
files processed include only source and header files (e.g, .c, .cpp, .h, etc.), and addi-
tionally exclude documentation and test folders in the project’s working tree.
As depicted in Table 5.6, there are significant differences in size across the ver-
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sions studied. Version 28, representing the middle version, is nearly double (1.7
times) the size of version 6 when measured in lines of code (LOC). The last version,
49, has more than double (2.25 times) the LOC than in version 6, and is 1.3 times
larger than version 28. Likewise, the number of files in the last version, 49, are more
than double (2.25 times) the number in version 6. Given such large differences, we
would expect that Firefox version 49 is a much different piece of software than it
was at version 6.
A concern with Firefox version 49 being much different from version 6 relate to
the validity of the Previously Vulnerable Assumption. Recall that the Previously Vul-
nerable Assumption presented in Section 4.4 states that if a vulnerability is fixed in
version N, then we assume all previous versions are also vulnerable. In this case, if
our data indicates that some file (e.g., foo.c) was fixed in version 49, then, contingent
on the existence of foo.c in each version, we would assume that foo.cwas vulnera-
ble in all previous versions 6 through 48. However, software which undergoes such
significant change can see the vulnerability either masked or exposed more promi-
nently as the topology of the call structure changes [92], as functionality migrates in
and out of other files, or the project is otherwise refactored. Conversely, the Previ-
ously Vulnerable Assumption may find limitation when a file is renamed throughout
its lifetime. In that case, using our example of foo.c fixed in version 49, our labeling
technique would fail to identify foo.c in version 48 if the file was renamed between
versions 48 and 49. Although we’ve noted this concern, we remind the reader that
our decision to apply it for metric evaluation in Firefox is derived from our careful
study of the CVE data associated with Firefox, as discussed in Section 4.4.
Figure 5.2 is a visualization the number of vulnerabilities, binned to the nearest
whole-numbered (i.e., major) version of Firefox, over our inspection interval I =
{6, . . . ,49}. In this figure, VulnCount represents the number of unique CVE entries
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plotted against the versions to which they apply. As shown, the figure represents
view of the historical vulnerability density in Firefox over I . The figure visually
depicts the pattern we noticed in CVE data for Firefox that supports the Previously
Vulnerable Assumption and forms the basis for feature evaluation when building
prediction models for Firefox.
Figure 5.2: Historical vulnerability density for Firefox versions 6..49
The list of applicable affected versions is derived directly from the CVE entries
themselves. Firefox related CVE entries in the NIST NVD, for versions 6 to 36, specif-
ically enumerate all prior versions as previously discussed in Section 4.3. A short
tabular summary of the top ten versions, sorted by VulnCount per version, is shown
in Table 5.7.
The pattern, as depicted by Figure 5.2 and Table 5.7, shows the effect of a retroac-













Table 5.7: Vulnerabilities per Firefox version, 6..49
loquially speaking, we feel the catch phrase a “rising tide lifts all boats” fits well
here. Early visualization of this data for Firefox informed our vulnerability table
construction technique discussed in Section 4.5 and the also resulted in the Previ-
ously Vulnerable Assumption presented in Section 4.3.
Because the vulnerability table used for training is built from files known to be
vulnerable, it consists of samples from the residual vulnerability population and
thereby forms an approximation of the true vulnerability distribution for Firefox.
We refer the reader to the concept of the vulnerability signal and fix signal discussed
in Section 4.5.1. The green NumFixedVulns in Figure 5.3 represents the number of
Bugzilla security issues fixed, plotted against each Firefox version – the fix signal.
Note that the count of files fixed, CountFixedFiles, closely tracks NumFixedVulns (or
the fix signal) in Figure 5.3.
Our overall model building approach and corresponding view of fix and vulnera-
bility signals is reinforced when we plot the number of fixed issues from the ITS for
each RLS version (see Section 5.3.5) against counts of Firefox CVE entries per RLS ver-
sion. This plot is shown in Figure 5.4, and shows the impact of known security fixes
(the blue line) against the the count of unique CVE entries (the green line) affecting
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Figure 5.3: Fixed files and fixed security issues; Firefox 6..49
each version of Firefox. As shown, features A and B from fixes in the earlier version
slices more severely lag in their appearance in the CVE data due to the effects of the
Previously Vulnerable Assumption.
Note that Figure 5.4 simply plots two measured values present in our mined data.
We can see that the tip of feature A, between versions 16 to 18, leads its appearance in
the CVE data around slice 18. The image also shows what appears to be an increasing
phase shift where the fix signal is echoed more rapidly in the CVE vulnerability counts
of later slices. Because the overall density curve is standardized by the total sum
of all CVE counts for all slices, the density signal flattens out and shows the effects
of the spike near version 45 from the fix signal much less prominently. This view
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supports the Previously Vulnerable Assumption because the high counts from the
spike at 45 feed backward into prior slices, which works to reduce its impact on the
density curve at version 45.














Figure 5.4: Similar trend observations A and B
We remind the reader that our statements and assumptions are based on our au-
tomatically mined data for Firefox (and our other subjects) and although we observed
similar patterns across all our study subjects, each project’s signature is relevant for
model evaluation against it alone. We also note that the results of metric evaluation
(such as when using Spearman correlation) are contingent on the accuracy of the
mined data; the accuracy and shape of the vulnerability density curve is subject to
the accuracy of the mined data.The shape of the vulnerability density curve used for
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CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
AltAvgLineCode 0.127 0.034 0.018 0.064
AltCountLineCode 0.287 0.059 0.063 0.154
AvgCyclomatic 0.111 0.007 0.041 0.073
AvgCyclomaticModified 0.116 0.009 0.042 0.075
AvgCyclomaticStrict 0.114 0.012 0.037 0.072
AvgEssential 0.125 0.007 0.049 0.083
CountDeclFunction 0.260 0.076 0.041 0.118
CountLineCode 0.278 0.069 0.051 0.141
CountLineCodeDecl 0.286 0.049 0.076 0.162
CountLineCodeExe 0.254 0.064 0.048 0.127
CountLineComment 0.293 0.075 0.048 0.148
CountLinePreprocessor 0.260 0.111 0.004 0.093
CountStmt 0.278 0.064 0.054 0.144
CountStmtDecl 0.279 0.050 0.071 0.155
CountStmtExe 0.254 0.071 0.040 0.121
MaxCyclomatic 0.191 0.053 0.029 0.091
MaxCyclomaticModified 0.197 0.057 0.029 0.093
MaxCyclomaticStrict 0.193 0.058 0.027 0.090
MaxEssential 0.195 0.058 0.031 0.091
MaxNesting 0.190 0.054 0.029 0.089
RatioCommentToCode 0.001 0.017 0.020 0.004
SumCyclomatic 0.256 0.063 0.051 0.128
SumCyclomaticModified 0.260 0.067 0.049 0.128
SumCyclomaticStrict 0.255 0.065 0.049 0.126
SumEssential 0.268 0.066 0.055 0.134
Table 5.8: Average Spearman ρ for file complexity metrics; Firefox 7..26
evaluation of metrics results from the table marking approach discussed in Section
4.5.
5.3.1 File Level Complexity Metrics
Table 5.8 shows the average Spearman correlations of file complexity metrics with
severity quantification metrics for Firefox versions 7 to 26. All correlations have
p < 0.05.
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Version t_stat M_vuln M_neut Mean Ratio
CountDeclFunction 14.244 46.488 9.948 4.673
CountLineCodeDecl 13.451 275.398 73.338 3.755
MaxNesting 19.974 3.203 1.449 2.211
SumCyclomatic 13.572 204.188 38.911 5.248
SumEssential 13.550 122.037 21.888 5.576
Table 5.9: Welch t_stat measures for top performing complexity metrics; Firefox
7..26
Version CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
CountTouches 0.317 0.006 0.139 0.219
CountTouchesP1 0.301 0.010 0.136 0.210
CountTouchesP2 0.284 0.016 0.134 0.202
HCPF 0.302 0.011 0.117 0.197
LinesAdded 0.305 0.007 0.118 0.202
LinesModified 0.299 0.022 0.106 0.186
LinesDeleted 0.307 0.001 0.125 0.208
TotalTouches 0.273 0.055 0.070 0.138
Table 5.10: Average Spearman ρ for file churn metrics; Firefox 7..26
Table 5.9 shows the average t_stat from Welch’s test, along with the average mean
for the vulnerable and neutral set. Also shown is the ratio of the vulnerable to neutral
mean for the top performing complexity metrics (per test harness described in 5.1).
5.3.2 File Level Churn Metrics
Table 5.10 shows the average Spearman correlations of file churn metrics with sever-
ity quantification metrics for Firefox versions 7 to 26.
Table 5.11 shows the average t_stat from Welch’s test, along with the average
mean for the vulnerable and neutral set. Also shown is the ratio of the vulnerable
to neutral mean for file churn metrics.
Table 5.12 shows an X where the p < 0.05 value from Welch’s t test for churn
metrics for the versions 7..26 of Firefox. We note that thep fails to indicate statistical
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Version t_stat M_vuln M_neut Mean Ratio
CountTouches 13.555 4.876 0.517 9.430
CountTouchesP1 13.156 10.023 1.223 8.199
CountTouchesP2 12.811 15.026 1.936 7.760
HCPF 6.988 0.006 0.000 18.811
LinesAdded 6.656 55.947 3.047 18.359
LinesDeleted 5.723 49.298 2.433 20.262
LinesModified 7.262 28.755 1.338 21.487
TotalTouches 12.354 124.238 13.870 8.957
Table 5.11: Welch t_stat measures for file churn metrics; Firefox 7..26
significance among the metrics, in some version slices and therefore may not be
suitable for use as a class discriminator.
5.3.3 Module Level Burst and Architectural Metrics
Table 5.13 shows the average Spearman correlations of change burst churn metrics
CB(2,2) with severity quantification metrics for Firefox versions 7 to 26. Table 5.14
shows the average Spearman correlations of module metrics with severity quantifi-
cation metrics for Firefox versions 7 to 26. Table 5.15 shows the average t_stat
from Welch’s test, along with the average mean for the vulnerable and neutral set.
Also shown is the ratio of the vulnerable to neutral mean for module metrics. Table
5.16 shows the results of p value testing from Welch’s t test for module metrics.
The results indicate applicability for discriminative power only over certain version
slices.
5.3.4 Firefox Prediction Experiments
In the limited number of experiments we were able to perform with churn and tra-




















































7 X X X 0 0 0 0 X
8 X X X 0 0 0 X X
9 X X X 0 0 0 0 X
10 X X X 0 0 0 0 X
11 X X X X X 0 X X
12 0 X X 0 0 X 0 X
13 X 0 X X X 0 X X
14 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X
15 X 0 X X X 0 0 X
16 X X 0 X 0 X 0 X
17 X X X 0 0 X 0 X
18 X X X X 0 0 0 X
19 0 X X 0 0 0 X X
20 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 X
21 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
22 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X
23 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 X
24 X X 0 0 0 0 0 X
25 0 X X 0 X X 0 X
26 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 X
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Table 5.12: Results of file churn metric pval tests, 7..26; X: p < 0.05
CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
CountTouches 0.387 0.071 0.197 0.368
CountReversals 0.361 0.059 0.192 0.344
MaxSeqByDate 0.335 0.082 0.175 0.324
CountBursts 0.373 0.07 0.194 0.356
CountFilesChanged 0.403 0.11 0.231 0.395
NetAddedInBurst 0.396 0.1 0.236 0.39
TotalChurnInBurst 0.397 0.099 0.233 0.389
Table 5.13: Average Spearman ρ for change burst metrics CB(2,2); Firefox 7..26
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CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
APIU 0.272 0.298 0.036 0.16
k_ext_fa .096 0.32 0.172 0.173
k_ext_m 0.167 0.206 0.163 0.22
MII 0.105 0.18 0.025 0.061
N_API 0.38 0.256 0.331 0.427
Table 5.14: Average Spearman ρ for module metrics; Firefox 7..26
Version t_stat M_vuln M_neut Mean Ratio
APIU -0.467 0.036 0.047 0.762
k_ext_fa 1.222 53.989 13.352 4.044
k_ext_m 0.600 456.671 306.405 1.490
MII 2.352 0.233 0.085 2.749
N_API 2.148 507.838 112.633 4.509
Table 5.15: Welch t_stat measures for module metrics; Firefox 7..26
Version APIU k_ext_fa k_ext_m MII N_API
1 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 X 0 X 0
18 0 X 0 X 0
19 0 X 0 X 0
20 0 X 0 X 0
21 0 X 0 X 0
22 0 X 0 X 0
23 0 X 0 X 0
24 0 X 0 X 0
25 0 X 0 X 0
26 0 X 0 X 0
27 0 X 0 X 0
Table 5.16: Results of module metric pval tests, Firefox 7..26; X: p < 0.05
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spite the churn metrics p value from the Welch test exceeding 0.05.
5.3.4.1 Firefox experiment comparing complexity and churn, K = 3
Table 5.17 shows prediction performance of our prediction test harness selecting the
best three complexity features and performing vulnerability predictions for Firefox
versions 7 to 26. The three best selected features were, in order: SumCyclomatic-
Modified, SumEssential, and CountDeclFunction.
Table 5.18 shows prediction performance of our prediction test harness select-
ing the best three file churn features and performing vulnerability predictions for
Firefox versions 7 to 26. The features selected were, in order: CountTouches, Count-
TouchesP1, and TotalTouches.
Comparing predictions from Table 5.17 and Table 5.18, we note generally higher
precision values and tighter variance in prediction accuracy within 2σ , or the 95%
confidence interval.
5.3.4.2 Firefox experiment comparing complexity and churn, K = 5
We increased K from three to five and re-ran the experiment described in Section
5.3.4.1. The model using only complexity metrics selected, in order: SumCyclomat-
icModified, CountDeclFunction, SumCyclomatic, SumEssential, and CountStmtDecl.
Table 5.19 shows the mean precision and the accuracy of mean precision inside the
95% confidence interval.
The model using churn metrics selected, in order: TotalTouches, CountTouches,
CountTouchesP1, CountTouchesP2, and HCPF. Table 5.20 shows the mean precision
and the accuracy of the mean precision inside the 95% confidence interval. The
comparison of the two results shows a marked improvement using the churn based
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Table 5.17: Mean precision (Mprec) performance using complexity metrics; K = 3;
Firefox versions 7..26
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Table 5.18: Mean precision (Mprec) performance using file churn metrics; K = 3;
Firefox versions 7..26
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Table 5.19: Mean precision (Mprec) performance using file complexity metrics; K = 5;
Firefox versions 7..26
learner. These results are particularly impressive, but require additional validation
to ensure that the learning model isn’t falling prey to the pitfalls related to measuring
vulnerability oracles as discussed in Section 4.5.1. In Section 5.3.5, we review Firefox
release numbering as it relates to our techniques to build our training data to ensure
we have not unwittingly introduced a vulnerability oracle.
5.3.5 Firefox Release Correspondence to Collected Data
Although the nightly labels are each about a month apart, the calendar duration
between the nightly label (NB) and the corresponding release label (RB) may vary
anywhere from three to six months. Note that the span between NB and RLS versions
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Table 5.20: Mean precision (Mprec) performance using file churn metrics metrics;
K = 5; Firefox versions 7..26













Table 5.21: Firefox release (RLS) versions vs. first tagged nightly build (NB) versions,
ordered by date
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is greater than the typical month and a half, or six week release interval following
Mozilla’s Rapid Release Calendar. Table 5.21 shows an example four month span
between April 12, 2001, when the 6.0a1 label was assigned, and August 16, 2011
when version 6.0 was released. We also show a simplified depiction of the relative
version sequencing in Figure 5.5; simplified, because we’ve omitted branch detail for
visual clarity.
Figure 5.5: Simplified visualization showing nightly version 6.0a1 to release version
6.0
5.3.6 Discussion
Our automated mining techniques result in prediction between the nightly build
version and the final release version as discussed in Section 5.3.5. In the construction
of our training data, we were careful compare the set of files existing in the first prior
nightly build (NB), or the X.0a1 version from the Mozilla Central development trunk,
to those files that were fixed for a vulnerability in a particular release X. That is, we
measure on NB X.0a1, and then compare predictions to know fixes on RB X.
Table 5.21 shows the sequencing of nightly build (NB) versions, (labeled as X.0a1),
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relative to the release (RLS) versions (labeled as X.0). For example, NB version 6.0a1
corresponds to RLS version 6.0. Note that the FixVersion, or the version mined from
associated ITS reports, corresponds to the RLS version and not the NB version. As
such, we believe the development occurring on the main line of development (i.e.
“master”, or “trunk”) provides the needed separation to avoid measuring security
fixes as vulnerability oracles as discussed in Section 4.5.
As stated, we mined our VCS based metrics from the git repository commit re-
vision corresponding to the NB, and not the RLS label. We also extracted the NB
versions as individual snapshots for the collection of conventional complexity met-
rics, such as shown in Table . In similar form, the changes that define our period
based frequency metrics (e.g. file level churn and module level change bursts) were
collected from the respective nightly label.
Given the differences in our collection and comparison approach, our numbers
may not be directly comparable to past research studying Firefox. First, the versions
in our study are years more recent. Second, with the exception of CveCount, we don’t
evaluate correlation relative to frequency based counts. Third, we have introduced
new measurements according to an entirely new characterization of severity. With
all the preceding caveats stated, we note relatively higher correlation values for our
file complexity results when compared to that reported by Shin [81]. Top Spear-
man correlation values in her study of Firefox are set next to the correlation values
reported for CveCount earlier in this section.
5.4 Case Study 2: Apache Web Server
We studied Apache HTTP Server versions 2.2.0 to 2.2.29, representing a time span
of over eight and a half years from December, 2005 to August, 2014. We studied the
133








Table 5.22: Firefox Spearman correlation comparison





Table 5.23: Apache adoption by version [50]
micro (patch) versions of Apache HTTP Server 2.2.x. Table 5.23 shows the adoption
of the 2.2 version as of this writing, thus reinforcing our decision to study 2.2.x.
Table 5.24 provides an overview of size measurements across the first, middle,
and last versions studied. The measurements shown here were collected from the
SciTools Understand tool and exclude documentation and test folders in the project’s
source code tree. Note that we’ve excluded the count of methods from this table
because Apache HTTP is implemented exclusively in the C programming language
(i.e., contains functions only).
As shown by Table 5.24, the various sizes are relatively stable across the versions
studied. There were 18 files added between version 2.0.0 and 2.2.29, or a 6% increase
overall. Likewise, there is an approximate 7% increase in the number of lines between
versions 2.2.0 and 2.2.9.
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Version LOC CountFunctions CountFiles
2.2.0 113,138 2,799 305
2.2.15 118,183 2,898 309
2.2.29 120,950 2,977 323
Table 5.24: Apache HTTP Server project statistics
Figure 5.6: Historical vulnerability density in Apache HTTP versions 2.2.x, 0..29
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CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
AltAvgLineCode 0.036 0.041 0.135 0.079
AltCountLineCode 0.037 0.116 0.144 0.086
AvgCyclomatic 0.011 0.025 0.06 0.008
AvgCyclomaticModified 0.028 0.034 0.06 0.015
AvgCyclomaticStrict 0.01 0.005 0.075 0.003
AvgEssential 0.075 0.092 0.018 0.097
CountDeclFunction 0.043 0.13 0.173 0.097
CountLineCode 0.04 0.152 0.167 0.108
CountLineCodeDecl 0.007 0.05 0.099 0.026
CountLineCodeExe 0.034 0.157 0.158 0.107
CountLineComment 0.133 0.053 0.052 0.082
CountLinePreprocessor 0.017 0.143 0.072 0.082
CountStmt 0.016 0.14 0.156 0.082
CountStmtDecl 0.007 0.036 0.087 0
CountStmtExe 0.041 0.151 0.153 0.105
MaxCyclomatic 0.144 0.129 0.065 0.051
MaxCyclomaticModified 0.118 0.115 0.059 0.042
MaxCyclomaticStrict 0.085 0.141 0.113 0.012
MaxEssential 0.032 0.182 0.11 0.106
MaxNesting 0.028 0.197 0.173 0.147
RatioCommentToCode 0.113 0.067 0.084 0.119
SumCyclomatic 0.056 0.172 0.188 0.133
SumCyclomaticModified 0.05 0.162 0.18 0.127
SumCyclomaticStrict 0.05 0.158 0.173 0.118
SumEssential 0.039 0.171 0.159 0.11
Table 5.25: Average Spearman ρ for file complexity metrics; Apache HTTP 2.2.0..29
5.4.1 File Level Complexity Metrics
Table 5.25 shows the average Spearman correlations of file complexity metrics with
severity quantification metrics for Apache HTTP versions 2.2.0..29. All correlations
have p < 0.05.
Table 5.26 shows the average t_stat from Welch’s test, along with the average
mean for the vulnerable and neutral set. Also shown is the ratio of the vulnerable to
neutral mean for the top performing complexity metrics (per test harness described
in 5.1).
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Version t_stat M_vuln M_neut Mean Ratio
CountDeclFunction 3.616 28.027 7.679 3.650
CountLineCode 3.652 979.564 326.536 3.000
MaxNesting 4.119 4.082 2.197 1.858
SumCyclomatic 3.786 180.744 48.771 3.706
SumEssential 3.783 101.580 27.256 3.727
Table 5.26: Welch t_stat measures for top performing complexity metrics; Apache
versions 2.2.x..29
CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
CountTouches 0.185 0.134 0.065 0.044
CountTouchesP1 0.168 0.109 0.061 0.050
CountTouchesP2 0.168 0.108 0.064 0.052
HCPF 0.175 0.083 0.007 0.069
LinesAdded 0.180 0.091 0.020 0.073
LinesModified 0.166 0.061 0.010 0.076
LinesDeleted 0.138 0.087 0.014 0.061
TotalTouches 0.040 0.156 0.134 0.083
Table 5.27: Average Spearman ρ for file churn metrics; Apache versions 2.2.x..29
5.4.2 File Level Churn Metrics
Table 5.27 shows the average Spearman correlations of file churn metrics with sever-
ity quantification metrics for Apache HTTP versions 2.2.x..29
Table 5.28 shows the average t_stat from Welch’s test, along with the average
mean for the vulnerable and neutral set. Also shown is the ratio of the vulnerable
to neutral mean for file churn metrics.
5.4.3 Module Level Burst and Architectural Metrics
Table 5.29 shows the average Spearman correlations of change burst churn metrics
CB(2,2) with severity quantification metrics for Apache HTTP versions 2.2.x..29. We
note that CountBursts shows relatively high correlation with AvgScore, which is one
of the more conservative estimates of overall severity, since it is averaged over the
137
Version t_stat M_vuln M_neut
CountTouches 2.328 0.761 0.204
CountTouchesP1 2.109 4.713 1.510
CountTouchesP2 2.156 8.737 2.815
HCPF 0.869 0.033 0.005
LinesAdded 0.858 3.577 0.351
LinesDeleted 0.173 0.833 0.229
LinesModified 0.737 1.268 0.306
TotalTouches 5.097 136.313 43.138
Table 5.28: Welch t_stat measures for churn metrics; Apache versions 2.2.x..29.
CveCount AvgScore MaxScore TotalScore
CountTouches 0.378 0.352 0.189 0.315
MaxSeqByDate 0.364 0.332 0.189 0.315
CountBursts 0.277 0.252 0.143 0.249
CountFilesChanged 0.275 0.251 0.158 0.247
NetAddedInBurst 0.252 0.218 0.149 0.244
TotalChurnInBurst 0.259 0.224 0.152 0.25
Table 5.29: Average Spearman ρ correlations for burst metrics; Apache HTTP ver-
sions 2.2.x..29.
individuals within the module.
Module metrics for Apache are withheld. Apache HTTP uses many C prepro-
cessor macros and additional add on packages in order to build the software. Being
focused on automated techniques, we did not manually provide any of the additional
information to help the Understand tool better resolve symbols needed to compile
Apache HTTP. Since we did not manually resolve or provide additional resolution
for the Understand tool, only k_ext_m, total calls from other modules, appeared in
the data, and did so with a suspect correlation of 0.5. We posit that conditionally
compiled code regions were double-counted. We describe additional detail related
to the pitfalls when calculating module metrics that result from the lack of precision
in our automated methods in Section 4.6.
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5.4.4 Discussion
An outstanding result of our experiments with Apache HTTP is the high correlation
between the burst metrics and our severity quantification metrics (i.e., AvgScore,
MaxScore, and TotalScore). This result is especially interesting because the correla-
tion is assessed on a subset of modules already known to be vulnerable (i.e., Vuln =
1). In this context, we are not comparing the metrics’ discriminative power, but are
assessing their relationship to the severity of those known-vulnerable modules (i.e.,
labeled Vuln = 1). Said another way, the correlation values we are presenting in this
particular discussion do not reflect the respective metrics’ classification ability, but
are presented as a relative quantification of severity.
In particular, as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, CountFilesChanged and TotalChurn-
InBurst show rank order correlation values as high as 0.90 with our aforementioned
severity quantification metrics. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 depict a strong correlation
in one or more module metrics we can use to enhance our learner.
Initial prediction experiments with using complexity features for vulnerability
prediction in Apache HTTP showed terrible performance. Mean precision was con-
sistently below 0.40, with large accuracy values (> 0.30) required to achieve the 95%
confidence interval, suggesting a prediction model built with complexity features
alone would perform poorly for predicting vulnerabilities in Apache HTTP.
Noting the high correlation between the number of files changed within a burst,
and a known vulnerable module, we added an additional score feature used to train
our prediction model. When training the model, we cross-reference the file to the
module of which it is a member. We then query the TEDB for the burst features
associated with that module, extract CountFilesChanged, extending our feature set.



































































































































































Version MP_A Accuracy A MP_B Accuracy B
3 0.57 0.35 0.59 0.25
4 0.55 0.46 0.60 0.37
5 0.58 0.26 0.61 0.21
6 0.54 0.46 0.59 0.37
7 0.46 0.31 0.53 0.26
8 0.55 0.25 0.49 0.28
9 0.55 0.23 0.49 0.35
10 0.38 0.18 0.58 0.25
Table 5.30: Comparison of mean precision and its accuracy over early Apache ver-
sions; 2.2.3..2.2.10.
results in improved mean precision, while also narrowing the standard deviation
across samples of predicted results in versions 3 through 7. Narrowing the standard
deviation improves our 95% confidence interval around the mean precision. Table
5.30 shows the comparison between mean precision evaluated with 10x10 cross fold
evaluation with an ANOVA selection filter set for the top five features. Group B (MP_B
and Accuracy B) reflects the module metric enhancement.
The result is compelling because the single addition of CountFilesChanged is a
simple change, yet results in noticeable prediction performance improvement. One
can envision much more elaborate and well designed scoring functions that make
better use of our severity quantification measures during training. Moreover, due to
the high correlation between CountFilesChanged and severity, as quantified by the
sum of CVSS scores from the respective module, it logically follows that correctly
predicted results will be of greater significance, as argued throughout this work.
Yet another strong trend exhibited for Apache was that of the churn metrics
CountTouchesP1 and CountTouchesP2. Figure 5.9 shows what appear to be strong
correlation values in the more vulnerable versions of Apache HTTP server. Spikes
in vulnerability fix activity at 12, 22, and 28 are preceded by observable spikes in
correlation between churn metrics and Average Score. This correlation with our
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quantification of severity is interesting because average score is the most conserva-
tive of our CVSS based quantification metrics.
Figure 5.9: Churn metric correlation in vulnerable versions of Apache 2.2.x
5.5 Case Study 3: MySQL Database Server
We studied Oracle MySQL Database Server versions 5.5.0 to 5.5.54, representing a
time span of approximately seven years from December, 2009 to November, 2016.
Table 5.31 provides an overview of size measurements across the first, middle, and
last versions studied. The measurements shown here were collected from the Sci-
Tools Understand tool and exclude documentation and test folders in the project’s
source code tree.
An interesting trend in MySQL that differs from our other case studies is the
decreasing size in LOC. There is approximately a 9% reduction in LOC between ver-
sions 5.5.0 and 5.5.54. This reduction stands in contrast to our other study subjects
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Version LOC CountFunctions CountMethods CountFiles
5.5.0 741,042 27,292 17,510 2,015
5.5.28 670,181 28,196 17,480 2,058
5.5.54 673,662 28,293 17,509 2,061
Table 5.31: MySQL Database project statistics
that both show increases in LOC between their first and last versions. We do note,
however, that despite decreases in LOC, MySQL shows marginal (approximately 4%)
increase in the number of its functions and files (only a 2% increase). Assuming
the software at version 5.5.54 represents identical or increased functionality, the
reduction in LOC and increase in files could represent refactoring activity to remove
duplicate code and/or increase the use of templatized or auto-generated code.
Figure 5.10: Historical vulnerability density in MySQL DB versions 5.5.x, 0..50
As shown from Figure 5.10, the vulnerability distribution is heavily oriented at
version 5.5.0. This caused us to restart our automated data mining approach for
MySQL, starting at 5.4.9.
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Due to differences in the way in which the vulnerability table was built from the
VCS mined entries for MySQL, we discovered the results produced to be inaccurate
upon analysis. Final results are withheld for a future addendum.
5.6 Discussion
A review of the literature, along with empirical data collected by our study, indicate
that the majority of files in a project are only involved in one vulnerability in their
lifetime. Note that this doesn’t contradict our Previously Vulnerable Assumption.
Although one can impart a greater penalty factor to files already known vulnerable,
such as when performing a scored ranking of predicted results, the Previously Vul-
nerable Assumption doesn’t make any assertion about future events. However, what
we can assert, and what our empirical data support, is that a software project’s true
vulnerability density (which can never really be known), is better approximated by
applying the Previously Vulnerable Assumption to mark files as vulnerable in earlier
versions.
We reason therefore, and provide evidence here, that metrics better reflecting a
software project’s inherent architectural properties, and that also correspond with
earlier lifecycle development activity, are better at approximating that project’s Vul-
nerability Signal. We define the Vulnerability Signal as a current pre-image of future
security fixes likely to be needed for a project, following from that project’s true
vulnerability density. Every time a security fix is made to a software project, we
learn new information that leads us closer to approximating the true vulnerability
density. We reason that metrics “locking on” to a projects vulnerability signal at ear-
lier stages will aid earlier detection. Because there is already substantial empirical
evidence suggesting that standard issue (i.e., not vulnerability specific) defect fixes
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are tightly correlated with development activity, it would stand to reason that some
subset of future fix activity will be needed for the correction of residual vulnerabili-
ties.
Metrics better corresponding to a time-based view of a projects’ development his-
tory are therefore likely to better approximate this its true vulnerability signal. Our
data and visualizations support the notion that applying the Previously Vulnerable
Assumption to retroactively mark the training set has the advantage of re-evaluating
interconnected components in situ, that is, in the context of their architecture and
interconnections with other components in earlier stages. In addition, the manner
in which a known-vulnerable entity is integrated with it’s surrounding architecture,
make the negative ramifications of that single vulnerability more significant. There-
fore, we view measurement and evaluation of vulnerability prediction metrics better
estimated with their relationship to overall severity, and have provided an example
of one approach using CVE scoring data to better quantify severity.
Conventional supervised machine learning model building approaches focus on
metric correlation with vulnerability frequency (i.e. RawCount). In these models,
metrics for files in version N are evaluated for their correlation against RawCount
in version N + 1. That is, the metrics used as features in such models are selected
because of their correlation against the probability of a future security fix. For some
version N, the probability of a future security fix in version N + 1 is estimated as
relative frequency with which files in N (for some known set, labeled with known
values from N + 1 for training) will undergo a vulnerability fix in version N + 1. In
these conventional models, repeat offenders, or files that are known to have been a
part of more than one security issue fix, will show greater probability because their
RawCount is higher relative to the other vulnerable files known in version N. This
is most similar to evaluation of RawCount in our labeled data. As shown in Figure
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5.11, between versions 6 and 49, there are well over a hundred files that are only
ever involved in a single security issue fix, while ten files are involved in two issues,
and three files involved in three security fixes.
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Figure 5.11: Repeat offenders; Firefox versions 6..49
Metrics selected based on linear correlation (i.e., Pearson) or rank order corre-
lation (i.e. Spearman) RawCount, suffer to capture the true residual vulnerability
density and corresponding severity of vulnerabilities latent in the released software
product. This shortcoming in conventional approaches may be heightened when
using automated techniques for model building as we have described in this work.
Recall that the vulnerability signal, as we define it, is a property of the overall true
vulnerability density of a software. While we can never really know the true vul-
nerability density, assuming we have the appropriate repositories available, we can
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better approximate a software’s true vulnerability density as security fixes are made
over time. That is, every time a released software product is fixed for a security
vulnerability, we learn new information about the source code entities involved.
Our experience shows this phenomenon exacerbated when used with automated
mining approaches that fail to appropriately pre-filter the source code included in
the labeled Vuln = 1 set. As we observed in our experience with Firefox, test files
(e.g., updated for regression tests) are often updated in tandem with the set of files
needed to fix the vulnerability in the released product. Test files, while part of the
development repository, are not included in the final binary released to a software
product’s end users. Such test files therefore have no bearing on residual vulnerabil-
ities (and their associated severity). Mining and supervised learning approaches that
fail to pre-filter such test files will therefore tend to include them in their predicted
results.
Using test files as an example, model building techniques that fail to filter test
files from their training sets would consequently include such files in their predicted
results. The precision and recall rates reported for such learners might appear im-
pressive, but would fail to accurately reflect the true distribution of residual vulnera-
bilities in the released software product. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
test files are not representative of the product’s true vulnerability density once it
reaches its user base. Worse yet, because empirical data show that the majority of
files that are fixed to correct a vulnerability, are most often done so one time, the
inclusion of test files may artificially inflate recall rates and reduce overall precision
when said test files are also repeat offenders; in other words, test files would “dilute”
the practical application of the predicted results.
The inclusion of test files in predicted results is not only inaccurate with respect
each individual vulnerability prediction, but it also prevents the learner from locking
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on to the true vulnerability signal, which as we reasoned earlier, is not accurately
characterized by repeat offenders alone (i.e., RawCount based). Empirical data re-
peatedly show an order of magnitude more files individually associated with single
security fixes (i.e., 1:1), than are associated with multiple security fixes (i.e., 1:N). For
a given software product on which we wish to perform vulnerability prediction, if we
assume such empirical observations are some approximation of the real population
of residual vulnerabilities, then the resulting models (built with RawCount estima-
tors) would suffer to solve the real problem of predicting a wider range of entities
responsible for residual vulnerabilities because they favor a minority (repeat offend-
ers) within the vulnerable file population. Our experience with automatically mined
test files being included in the vulnerable file set (i.e., labeled Vuln = 1), informs
our claims and also serve as an intuitive example where non-essential, less relevant
items, dilute model performance.
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Chapter 6
Contributions and Future Work
This chapter summarizes our research problem: the residual vulnerability problem,
or the latent persistence of security related defects, termed vulnerabilities, remaining
in software after its release. We review the problem’s significance as well as the
significance of our work in this context. We also highlight the creative, original, and
novel aspects of our research contribution and findings. We conclude this chapter
with caveats and suggestions for future research.
6.1 Contributions to Residual Vulnerability Prediction in Software
Our emphasis on more accurately characterizing the residual vulnerability problem
and focus on practical automated methods for better quantifying the severity of
vulnerability impact, leads directly to several of our significant contributions. A brief
description of each follows, with references as appropriate for additional detail.
A new approach for metric selection based on correlation with quantified mea-
sures of severity, for use in software vulnerability prediction models implemented
with supervised machine learners. Through careful explanation and reasoning about
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the residual vulnerability problem, we provide a completely new ontology that bet-
ter characterizes the relative value of predictions by evaluating their correlation with
quantified measures of severity based on CVE data.
A practical and automated approach to training set construction is presented
according to the new approach for metric selection, demonstrating the feasibility
of of automating the construction of a training set that is more representative of
the characteristic relationships between measurable features and our ontology for
learner evaluation. Specific techniques are discussed in Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6.
New insights revealed by our mined data lead to new ways of thinking about
vulnerability density over time in a software product. Hence, entirely new concepts
and additional explanations for previously observed phenomena emerge on review
of mined data (i.e., mined according to our approach for automated training set
construction). Specifically, this work discusses the following new concepts:
• Previous Vulnerability Assumption introduced as a new concept to aid train-
ing set construction, through careful study of CVE vulnerability data available
from the NIST National Vulnerability Database for the software projects stud-
ied in this work.
• Vulnerability Signal introduced as a new concept in 4.5, and empirically demon-
strated in Section 5, as the top edge defining a software project’s historical vul-
nerability distribution that appears when visualizing the count of unique CVE
entries against affected versions of a software product over time.
• Fix Signal and Vulnerability Oracle introduced as a new observed phenomena
in sections 4.5.1 and 5 that unify observations from past vulnerability predic-
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tion research; specifically the phenomena observed in our study better explain
the need for LOC correction and cross-correlation compensation when per-
forming prediction studies.
Empirical data supporting the value of historical evaluation is provided by way
of explanation and experiments in Chapter 5. Primarily, there are more samples
on which to train a machine learner when the Previously Vulnerable Assumption
holds for a software project. We argue that under certain conditions, this approach
better approximates the true population of vulnerabilities in the software, and by
extension, provides a better test environment in which to select features in order to
build and evaluate vulnerability prediction models.
6.2 A Timely Contribution
This work is especially timely, as one only needs to look at the non-stop stream of
news headlines publicizing the latest exploits and cyber attacks, testifying to the fact
that the state of computer and network security is not improving. In fact, one of the
core issues in computer security, one of the central issues enabling modern attacks,
is the insecurity of modern software [39]. Crypto-analytic attacks, hardware-based
attacks (such as side channel attacks) withstanding, the literature shows, and indus-
try widely recognizes, software borne vulnerabilities as a prime culprit responsible
for the majority of modern cyber security attacks against computers and informa-
tion networks. This state of affairs is at odds with the continual push within the
software industry to deliver compelling value added features. The current state of
affairs within the software development domain grows ever more acute as software
continually grows ever larger and more complex.
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The pace of development, increasing complexity, and ever growing distributed
nature of software products is at odds with classic security design principles such
as economy of mechanism and central mediation, making software more difficult to
comprehend when making changes, and more difficult to exhaustively test. Com-
pounding these factors are the forces vying for limited developer time. The com-
mercial sector, finds a feature-centered development culture where security con-
cerns often take a back seat to differentiating features; the return on investment
and impact to the bottom line resulting from the differentiating features is more
deterministic [53]. It’s not that the commercial sector doesn’t care about security,
but more about spending resources efficiently. Within the software development
industry, developer time is a constrained, highly contended, and highly demanded
resource. Management therefore wants to make efficient and effective use of devel-
oper time. This is the larger context and commercial motivations that just so happen
to be aligned against security improvement rather than with it. That is, given that
residual vulnerabilities are already known to be difficult to detect, what can be done
to motivate commercial development organizations to expend effort, appropriating
development resources to search for what is commonly known as “a needle in a
haystack"? The answer, from the perspective of this work, is to provide a superior
approach to building vulnerability prediction models by quantifying severity and
seeking out metrics that show correlation with the same.
We are confident that models built on such relationships will further enable what
we refer to as suspect prioritization, such that the “top 10”, or top suggested vul-
nerability predictions are likely to represent vulnerabilities that are exploitable and
have the potential to cause severe security violations, compromising confidentiality,
integrity, or availability. Ideally, the prioritized “top 10” should be free of false pos-
itives, thereby maximizing the efficacy of any resulting triage and inspection efforts
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when applied. Although the empirical results from our case studies did not show
stable mean precision values free of such false positives, we believe the framework
presented for metric evaluation provides a better approximation of, and is more con-
servative with respect to the true vulnerability density, and vulnerability distribution
across files and modules in a software project. Using the framework we presented
for metric evaluation, we were able to show that automatically mined, architecture
and change-based burst metrics selected for our study outperformed conventional
metrics in earlier characterization of severity. We therefore believe architectural
level and frequency based change metrics provide additional value as features to
consider when building supervised machine learning models for vulnerability pre-
diction.
Our work represents an important advancement in the area of vulnerability pre-
diction and we are already at work on future improvements. We remind the reader
of some key points from our work, because looking at the experimental numbers
alone fail to properly characterize the significance of our results. First, we largely
used an automated approach to data collection and classification. Second, aside from
the commercial SciTools Understand tool we used to collect conventional metrics
(and compute call based metrics), the tools we used for data extraction (i.e., git)
are widely and freely available. Lastly, our empirical data, and insights from it,
suggest future improvements from a new model building approach based on the ad-
ditional consideration of architectural information and application of what we have
presented as the Previously Vulnerable Assumption.
We stress the importance of the automated mining approach used. As working
professionals in the software industry, we highlight the importance of automated
approaches as key aspects of both the practicality and scalability required to further
motivate wider industry adoption (and corresponding overall socioeconomic bene-
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fits). We have stressed practicality for industry adoption several times throughout
this work. Developer time (not to mention time from developers with security ex-
pertise), is an extremely precious and limited resource. Developers busy at work
completing product-differentiating features have little time left to hunt through mil-
lions of lines of code to identify vulnerabilities. Moreover, when vulnerabilities in a
component are known, the usual practice is to patch or move to the subsequent ver-
sion. However, moving forward is not always possible, especially for already-fielded
embedded products lacking connectivity.
The tools we used for data extraction are significant in their simplicity. Einstein
is often quoted as saying “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not
simpler”. There are few primitives as widely universal as directory structures and
VCS control tools such as git. We leave the reader with the jovial remark, “how
much simpler can you git?” as a quick shorthand to remember our re-interpretation
of Naggappan et. al. [65] change-based burst metrics for git repositories, and module
identification according to directory structure of the same. The results, especially
from our Firefox case study, indicate that the frequency and size characteristics
of VCS-derived metrics (i.e., architectural change-bursts) offer earlier detection of
what might be considered a projects’ “vulnerability signal”, of which we provided
empirical evidence, and presented by logical reasoning via the concept we presented
as the Previously Vulnerable Assumption.
If we believe the Previously Vulnerable Assumption, that is, that a file or mod-
ule found vulnerable in the future was already vulnerable at present (but simply
undiscovered), then the implication is that earlier detection of whatever fundamen-
tal properties coincide with their vulnerability potential and severity provides value
in solving the residual vulnerability problem. In this ontological framework, we
seek closer correspondence between the innate features of such entities and any de-
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tectable features that relate not only to their probable occurrence as a vulnerability,
but that when exploited by bad actors, cause greater resulting impact. Furthermore,
this concept facilitates a mental construct for better characterization of a software
project as a whole, given its particular vulnerability density; that is, due to the man-
ner in which we ascribe severity, we would expect the impact from vulnerabilities
that are coincident with a project’s vulnerability signal, to be more damaging when
exploited in the future. For all these reasons, we therefore believe a historical model
built by applying these concepts, provides value by better characterizing severity,
and by increasing the number of samples on which to train supervised vulnerability
prediction models.
6.3 Future Work
There are several future directions for this work, however the most fundamental
deal with evaluation of ranked results, further validation of the approach, and more
clearly establishing the contexts and caveats characterizing it’s suitability an appli-
cability.
As presented, our approach is entirely new. The more modern and novel repository-
mined change-based frequency metrics, along with architectural module metrics,
showed mixed results for class discrimination largely dependent upon the partic-
ular version slice of the respective software project in which they were evaluated.
Indeed, although we experimentally “abused” the intent of our metrics in a classifica-
tion context, this work did not explore evaluation of actual ranked results as was our
original intent. Our original premise for the application of repository mined change
and architectural metrics was for use in a ranking stage within model pipelines where
established classification metrics would discriminate predictions to be ranked. This
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speaks to the need for additional validation beyond our initial evaluation of Spear-
man correlation measurements against our own CVE based quantification of severity.
We are excited to further explore the intended application for scoring. To this
end, we also note that CVE-based CVSS scores offered a convenient method for quan-
tifying severity, but the ideas presented are just as applicable to better severity
quantification techniques. Additionally, further validation is needed to understand
strengths and limitations of this approach. A key example for immediate inves-
tigation is research into the extent and applicability of the Previous Vulnerability
Assumption.
A caution related to the Previous Vulnerability Assumption is the extent to which
we apply it to a given software project. That is, the historical extent to which it is still
accurate to label vulnerable samples (e.g., files) for training vulnerability prediction
learners. We conjecture that the assumption holds as long as the corresponding soft-
ware project’s physical architecture (i.e., repository organization and inter-module
call structure) remains consistent over time (i.e., over successive versions). We note
here that future additional areas of research might investigate additional tuning
parameters that relate to penalty windows or tail limits that stop application of the
Previous Vulnerability Assumption at some prior version when building and labeling
the vulnerable training set.
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Chapter 7
Appendix 1: Mozilla Foundation
Security Advisory Data
This appendix is included for the benefit of others who wish to better under-
stand the companion software for this work, or who are interested in undertaking
a similar study utilizing Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories (MFSAs). In partic-
ular, depending on investigation time frame, different parsing approaches may be
required for MFSA pages. A particular example of a change in the MFSA format over
time is the location of the Bugzilla URLs, relative to the CVE (if listed).
MFSA pages published after September, 2016, contain a dedicated section tag
with class attribute "cve". Listing 7.1 shows a code snippet from the spider used
to parse pages with the dedicated cve section. The cve section in the more recent
MFSA pages yields more deterministic parsing results and is especially useful for
vulnerability oriented research since the CVE can be consistently determined.
MFSA pages published prior to 2006 often omit CVE, listing only the Bugzilla
URL. CVE is not listed consistently, if at all. A majority of the MFSA pages (from
2005 to late 2016) list fix information following a references heading. Most often,
the fix information includes one or more Bugzilla entries, *optionally* followed by
the associated CVE id. However, some MFSA pages do not follow the aforementioned
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structure, despite having been published after 2006.
The snippet in Listing 7.2 shows the formatting and parsing code for a MFSA
“summary" block. Note that the summary block is common to most MFSA pages.
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1 #
2 # MFSA 2016 -85 introduced the use of cve section blocks
3 #
4 # <section class ="cve">
5 # <h4 id="CVE -2016 -5270" class ="level -heading">
6 # <a href ="#CVE -2016 -5270" >
7 # <span class =" anchor">#</span >
8 # CVE -2016 -5270: Heap -buffer -overflow in
9 # nsCaseTransformTextRunFactory :: TransformString
10 # </a>
11 # </h4 >
12 # <dl class=" summary">
13 # <dt>Reporter </dt >
14 # <dd>Atte Kettunen </dd >
15 # <dt>Impact </dt >
16 # <dd><span class="level high">high </span ></dd>
17 # </dl >
18 # <h5 >Description </h5>
19 # <p>
20 # An out -of-bounds write of a boolean value during text
21 # conversion with some unicode characters
22 # </p>





href="https :// bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1291016" >
28 # Bug 1291016
29 # </a>
30 # </li>
31 # </ul >
32 # </section >
33 #
34
35 xpath_cve_section_block = ’//div[@itemprop =" articleBody "]\
36 /section[@class ="cve"]’
37 sel_cve_id = ’./*[ contains(@id ,"CVE")]/@id’
38 sel_cve_summary_text = ’./*[ contains(@id ,"CVE")]\
39 /a[contains(@href ,"#CVE")]/text()’
40 sel_cve_summary_block = ’./dl[@class =" summary "]’




’./*[ contains (./ text() ,"Description ")]/\
44 ./following -sibling ::p/text()’
45 sel_cve_bugzilla_url =
’./ul/li/a[contains(@href ," bugzilla ")]/ @href ’
Listing 7.1: Example MFSA with section “cve" and xpath parsing code
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1 #
2 # Typical format of a the common summary block.
3 #
4 # <dl class =" summary">
5 # <dt >Announced </dt ><dd>January 21, 2005</dd >
6 # <dt >Reporter </dt><dd > Firstname Lastname </dd>
7 # <dt >Impact </dt ><dd><span class =" level low">Low </span ></dd >
8 # <dt >Products </dt><dd >Firefox , Mozilla Suite </dd >
9 # <dt >Fixed in </dt>
10 # <dd >
11 # <ul>
12 # <li >Firefox 1</li >
13 # <li >Mozilla Suite 1.7.5 </li >
14 # </ul >




’//div[@itemprop =" articleBody "]/dl[@class =" summary "]’
19 sel_date_item_text =
’./dt[contains (.," Announced ")]/following -sibling ::dd/text()’
20 sel_impact_item_text =
’./dt[contains (.," Impact ")]/following -sibling ::dd/text()’
21 sel_fixedin_item_text = ’./dt[contains (.," Fixed in")]\
22
/following -sibling ::dd/ul/li[contains(., "Firefox ")]\
23 /text()’
Listing 7.2: Example common MFSA “summary" block
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Chapter 8
Appendix 2: Supplemental Analysis
This section contains additional graphs and data showing intermediate results gath-
ered during our study.
The scatter matrix in Figure 8.5 reflects intuitive relationships between traditional
complexity metrics across all versions sampled. As would be expected, the count
based metrics show strong linear relationships with each other.
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Figure 8.1: VulnCount as number of ITS entries (RawCount) fixed at specific ver-
sions
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Figure 8.2: Count of CVEs by maximum affected version
Figure 8.3: CVE density by version
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Figure 8.5: Firefox scatter matrix comparing count based metrics
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Figure 8.6: Firefox aggregate churn scatter matrix
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Figure 8.7: Preliminary visualization of aggregate burst metrics for Firefox, across
all all combinations of gap and burst size.
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Figure 8.8: Firefox vulnerability distribution; all versions
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Figure 8.9: Firefox vulnerability distribution; versions 3..49
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Figure 8.10: Aggregate complexity counts and vulnerabilities by Firefox version
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Figure 8.11: Maximum inheritance depth, nesting level, and vulnerabilities by Firefox
version
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Figure 8.12: Firefox maximum cyclomatic complexity metrics and vulnerabilities by
version
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Figure 8.13: Firefox path count and vulnerabilities by version
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Figure 8.14: Average LOC, source files, header files, and vulnerabilities by Firefox
version
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